Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism by Schulting, Dennis
9.1  Introduction
Kant grants that by means of the pure concepts in abstraction from 
sensible intuition we can and indeed must still think things in them-
selves as the ground of the appearances that we cognise as the empiri-
cally real objects of experience (cf. A96; Bxxvi; A143/B182). But what 
exactly do we think, in thinking things in themselves? This is an impor-
tant question to ask in the context of Kant’s subjectivism, since many 
commentators take Kant’s idealism to argue that objects are only ideal 
in regard to how they appear to us as spatiotemporal objects (appear-
ances), but not insofar as they are also things in themselves. If we 
abstract from what constitutes the spatiotemporality of objects, we 
can thus perfectly well conceive of their intrinsic nature, implying that 
Kant’s subjectivism does not affect the way we think about things in 
themselves, in abstraction from the properties that conform to our 
subjective conditions of knowledge (space and time). Or so these read-
ers argue. This would mean that we can be metaphysical realists of 
sorts about things in themselves, as indeed Hegel thinks we must (see 
Chap. 8), and thus that the categories are not limited to application to 
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372     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
appearances or indeed, as many contemporary so-called  metaphysical 
interpretations of Kant’s idealism claim, that we can be confident in 
claiming that the things that we know as spatiotemporally distinct 
objects, as appearances, are the same things that also have an in itself 
or intrinsic side, of which we are cognitively ignorant. Standardly, these 
readers believe that Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD), which is centrally about the applicability of the categories to 
spatiotemporal objects, is wholly separable from Kant’s idealism, which 
is centrally about space and time as subjective forms of intuition that 
are expounded in the Transcendental Aesthetic, not in TD. In Chap. 4, 
I provided an argument, which showed that Kant’s argument in TD is 
best seen in line with a benign form of phenomenalism. In this chap-
ter, I show that Kant’s subjectivism about conceptuality, the thesis that 
our thought, in virtue of the principle of apperception or transcen-
dental self-consciousness, is solely constitutive of the very conception 
of what an object is or what objectivity means, already entails ideal-
ism about objects. From Kant’s very notion of our discursivity idealism 
follows.
That idealism is entailed by our discursivity, and not first by the 
forms of our receptivity (space and time), does not mean that Kant’s 
argument for transcendental idealism is not crucially informed by 
the forms of our receptivity. But here I am not concerned with his 
arguments for idealism from space and time. Nor does it mean that 
because our discursivity entails idealism, the mere representation of a 
thing in itself entails idealism, suggesting that we cannot even think 
anything that is beyond our mere representation, that is, conceive 
of the very notion of a thing in itself. Robert Adams rightly believes 
that “in extending our categories ‘farther than the sensible intuition’ 
we can think consistently about things as they may be in themselves” 
(1997:810). Nevertheless, notwithstanding Kant’s observation at 
A96 that the pure concepts of the understanding can indeed “be 
extended further than experience can grasp (the concept of God)”, 
such an extension would appear to come down to what Kant says is 
a “transcendental use of a concept”, which “consists in its being 
related to things in general and in themselves” (A238/B298), and the 
possibility of which at one point Kant effectively rejects (A246/B303). 
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The operative question thus is what this supposedly consistent thought 
about things in themselves amounts to, if not the “real possibility of 
such things” (Adams 1997:810)? Do the categories have a relation at 
all to a thing in itself or do they “only signif[y] the unity of thinking 
in general” (B314/A259),1 by means of which nothing determinate 
is thought (Prol, 4:355), that is, do they constitute only a logical 
possibility (B302–3n.)?
The thesis that our conceptuality—as defined by my thesis of 
Kant’s radical subjectivism—implies idealism does not mean that we 
cannot even represent the notion of a thing in itself. That is to say, it 
does not constitute a short argument, namely an argument to the 
effect that, as Karl Ameriks has explained, the “mere reflection on 
the notion of a form of representation is taken to be sufficient for the 
Unknowability Thesis” (Ameriks 2000b:128),2 the latter amounting 
to the positive claim that we cannot have knowledge of things in 
themselves. It is not because the object—which, as represented, is 
formally distinguishable from its representation—can, trivially, only 
be represented through a representation and so not purely, without the 
mediation of representation, as a thing in itself, that idealism is entailed. 
The reason why the thought of a thing in itself implies idealism is not 
so much conceptual per se as that it has to do with the nature of a 
thing in itself, to which we have no access because of the limitations 
of our discursivity. This involves a complex, ‘long’ argument concerning 
transcendental materiality, or material synthesis, which is the ground 
of discursive judgement and thus of the very conceptual elements 
of possible experience, on the grounds of which the thing in itself 
can ex hypothesi not be determined as such, that is, as it is in itself. 
An exposition of this ‘long’ argument for idealism from the categories 
follows in Sect. 9.5 and following.
On my reading, the thing in itself (de re) is not identical strictly 
speaking to its being thought by means of mere concepts, so that the 
mere thought of a thing in itself does not eo ipso reach the thing in 
itself itself. I contend that the thought or concept of a thing in itself 
does not exhaust all of the thing’s properties, whose essence we thus 
cannot determine or define (other than a thing’s logically deducible 
characteristics, i.e. the a priori concepts of the understanding which 
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374     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
make up the intension of the concept of an object in general, that is, 
a possible object of knowledge, which should not be conflated with 
the thing in itself ).3 As Kant is reported to have said in one of his 
metaphysics lectures from 1784–85,
we can think a thing as omnimode determined, but we cannot determine 
it really, for then we would have to be omniscient so that we could think 
all of a thing’s possible predicates. (V-Met/Volckmann, 28:410; trans. and 
boldface mine)
Crucially, the thing in itself as it is conceived of is not necessarily 
how the thing in itself is or may be as such (de re). Put differently, 
the concept of a thing in itself does not map isomorphically onto 
the thing in itself (de re), which is exactly why according to the 
Critical Kant we are precluded from having knowledge of it through 
conceptual analysis alone.4 Idealism is not entailed because there is a 
putative thing that is ideal on the grounds of it being entirely or partly 
dependent on the epistemic or logical conditions of its being thought, 
or because the thing in itself is merely the concept of that which 
remains in abstraction from these conditions. Idealism is entailed 
rather because discursive thought is not capable of establishing, even 
merely conceptually, the thoroughly determined nature of the putative 
thing that is being thought.5 In fact, the thought or concept of a thing 
in itself does not pick out an object defined in any straightforward 
sense (i.e. a determinable distinct particular). The idealism here 
concerns the inherent limitation of discursive thinking, of our very 
conceptuality, as a result of which we cannot have a determinate 
concept of a thing in itself. This limitation is part and parcel of Kant’s 
radical subjectivism.
In arguing, in the following sections, that idealism affects our very 
conceptuality, I am thus going against the suggestion made by Adams 
that
Kant sees our possibility of conceiving of things in themselves as 
drastically limited, in the first instance, by a limitation, not of our active 
conceptual faculty, but rather of our passive intuitive faculty. (1997:806)
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I am also going against Erich Adickes in this regard, who writes:
It is thus not in the categories themselves and their positive characteristics 
that there lies an obstacle to knowing the things in themselves through 
them. (Adickes 1924:70)6
Again, I am of course not claiming that idealism is not concerned with 
the limitations of our sensibility, but I am claiming that the limitation 
also already affects our conceptual faculty. If we relate this to the ques-
tion regarding the possibility of the categories providing the minimal 
form of thinking an object in general, thus putatively enabling the 
thought of things in themselves as they are, in abstraction from sensible 
constraints, then it seems that, if not all the categories (see B300ff.), 
at least the categories of quality do not fit this framework, in particu-
lar, the category of limitation and, concomitantly, negation.7 It is to 
an account of these categories that I shall turn to support my claim 
that idealism already follows from discursivity or subjectivity alone. I 
shall make use of arguments that Kant provides in a transitional section 
in the Transcendental Dialectic, concerning the transcendental Ideal, 
where he speaks of the transcendental prototype or also the thing in 
itself in its proper metaphysical context (at A576/B604, Kant connects 
the topic of the transcendental Ideal with “the concept of a thing in 
itself ”).
As a corollary of the above set of claims, my general view on Kant’s 
idealism is that Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves amounts to a distinction between two kinds or classes of 
‘object’ (in the general sense) which map onto one ontological realm, 
namely Being itself, and only one of which is a determinate object for 
our cognition and only one of which is a completely determined indi-
vidual, a thing in itself.8 The one kind of object is not (numerically) 
identical to the other, while the one object represents, in some sense, 
a delimited part of the other. (One might argue that there is some sort 
of non-numerical identity between the two kinds of object, in that 
both kinds of object can be constituents of a composite entity; see Ertl 
2016.) Furthermore, there is no one-to-one isomorphism between 
phenomenal object or appearance and thing in itself, which is not to say 
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376     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
that there are not any isomorphisms between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal.9 The ‘object’ (in the general sense) is either an appear-
ance as an empirically real object (in Kant’s sense) or a thing in itself 
that is transcendentally real, whereby the empirically real object is, in 
some sense, a limitation of the transcendentally real ‘thing’, of reality 
tout court. Note that by reality tout court I do not mean empirical or 
physical reality. Reality tout court is, as such, not the reality of the 
appearances that we are able to determine as the objectively real spa-
tiotemporal objects of empirical nature. I also note that, whereas the 
putative real thing in itself is completely individuated and so is an 
individual (see below Sect. 9.6), one is not licensed to speak of the 
empirically real object of possible experience (i.e. the appearance) in 
terms of an individual.10 Only things in themselves are individuals 
strictly speaking.
I thus depart from two-aspect (one-object) readings of ideal-
ism, either the methodological version famously espoused by Henry 
Allison and others or the more recent metaphysical or ontological ver-
sions (e.g. Langton 1998; Allais 2006, 2007, 2015). There is consider-
able prima facie textual support for two-aspect readings (see Rosefeldt 
2007:170), but I believe both versions of two-aspectism run up against 
identity problems that have to do with their inability to account for 
the assumption that, apropos of the methodological two-aspect view, 
two exclusionary perspectives relate to one and the same thing/object 
and, as to the metaphysical two-aspects or two-properties reading, 
one and the same thing/object has two different exclusionary sets of 
properties (i.e. spatiotemporal properties and intrinsic properties) or, 
if not expressed in terms of metaphysical properties, is specifiable by 
“two ways of knowing the same things” (Allais 2006:160). As is well 
known, Kant believes that things in themselves are not spatial (A26/
B42), for spatial properties are not intrinsic properties but extrinsic 
ones and things in themselves are essentially and exclusively charac-
terised by their intrinsic properties; this means that spatial properties 
cannot be considered to be properties of the same things that are essen-
tially and exclusively characterised by their intrinsic properties, or 
in other words, exclusionary properties cannot be properties of one 
and the same thing.11 I also think that metaphysical two-aspectism 
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cannot account for the centrality of subjective agency in establishing 
the spatiotemporality of appearances, which was discussed in Chap. 7. 
Current metaphysical readings of idealism are conspicuously defi-
cient in explaining this major reason behind Kant’s subjective turn in 
philosophy.
My central claim here is thus that idealism is already entailed by our 
very conceptuality, independently even of sensibility, or, Kant’s subjec-
tivism centrally involves his idealism (in the sense of the fourth strand 
of my thesis of Kant’s radical subjectivism; see Chap. 1, Sect. 1.4). 
However, I deny that this means that the transcendentally real is an 
“empty category” or has no “ontological status” (Ameriks 2003:103). In 
fact, although I do not believe that the pure thought of a thing in itself 
has any object for itself (strictly speaking), on my reading the non-ideal, 
i.e. the thing in itself, has indeed a greater ontological status than the 
ideal, i.e. the phenomenal object (cf. Ameriks 2003:104). That is to say, 
there is some thing or entity or Being that is substantially more than the 
phenomenal object of experience, and whose truth thus transcends the 
evidence we have for our phenomenal experience. This ties in with my 
view of Kant’s idealism as a benign form of phenomenalism, which I 
argued in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
In Sects. 9.2–9.4, I present the negative argument for idealism 
from conceptuality, by delineating how the categories are restricted 
to their application to appearances and do not reach things in them-
selves, while allowing thoughts about that which goes beyond appear-
ances. This will mainly be done by canvassing passages in the Critique 
and the Prolegomena, where Kant indicates the limits of the use of 
the categories. I also critically engage with Allen Wood’s identity 
interpretation of idealism, which in my view conflicts with Kant’s 
own strictures on establishing the putative identity relation between 
appearances and things in themselves (Sect. 9.4). In Sect. 9.5, I rehearse 
the main elements of the central argument of TD. In Sects. 9.6–9.8, 
I then advance the positive argument for idealism from conceptuality, 
by arguing that (1) our conceptual (discursive) rules for determining 
objects (a priori synthesis) are grounded on a different kind of a priori 
synthesis, which I call material synthesis, which concerns what Kant 
calls the “sum total of all possibility” (A573/B601), that (2) material 
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378     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
synthesis concerns the thoroughgoing or complete determinacy of an 
individual, which Kant identifies as a thing in itself proper, and that 
therefore (3) we cannot, per impossibile, by means of the rules for deter-
mining objects determine the ground of those very rules. Hence, we 
cannot determine a thing in itself, just because our conceptual rules for 
determining objects eo ipso prohibit this.
9.2  Do the Categories Have Meaning Beyond 
the Bounds of Sensible Experience?
In the concluding sections of the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 
Kant writes that
it would be absurd [eine Ungereimtheit] for us to hope that we can know 
more of any object than belongs to the possible experience of it or lay 
claim to the least knowledge of how anything not assumed to be an 
object of possible experience is determined according to the constitution 
that it has in itself. (Prol §57, 4:350 [Kant 1977:91])
The reason for this, Kant says, is that objects are only knowable under 
certain conditions, that is, under the conditions of space and time 
as well as the concepts of the understanding, which “have no other 
use than to make experience possible”. Indeed, “if this condition 
[of sensibility, D.S.] is omitted from the pure concepts of the 
understanding, they do not determine any object and have no meaning 
whatever” (Prol, 4:350 [Kant 1977:91]).12
At the end of the Schematism chapter in the Critique, Kant asserts 
that without the schematisation of the concepts of pure understanding 
no relation to objects is provided. He is quite clear as to denying the 
possibility of “amplify[ing] the previously limited concept”, that is, the 
concept limited by a restricting condition concerning sensibility, so 
that “the categories in their pure significance, without any conditions 
of sensibility, should hold for things in general, as they are, instead of 
their schemata merely representing them how they appear”, and would 
thus “have a significance independent of all schemata and extending 
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far beyond them” (B186/A147).13 The significance that pure categories 
could have is only a “logical significance”, concerning “the mere unity 
of representations”, which yields no “concept14 of an object”. Kant 
concludes that
[w]ithout schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the 
understanding for concepts, but do not represent any object. This signifi-
cance comes to them from sensibility, which realizes the understanding at 
the same time as it restricts it. (B186–7/A147; emphasis added; cf. B253)
At B178 Kant is even clearer as to the putative application of categories 
to things in themselves:
[T]hey cannot pertain to things in themselves (without regard to how 
and whether they may be given to us) at all [auf Dinge an sich […] gar 
nicht gehen können15].
Nevertheless, Kant insists in the same Prolegomena passage quoted above 
that it would be “a still greater absurdity if we conceded [einräumen] no 
things in themselves” (Prol, 4:350–351 [Kant 1977:91]), even though 
it is true to say that the categories are not applicable to things in them-
selves and so cannot strictly speaking represent them as such. That the 
categories do not pertain or refer to things in themselves does not, as 
Kant says, imply there not being, in some sense, such things. It is not 
implied by the categories’ inability to apply to a thing in itself that the 
thing in itself is not what it is, whatever it is, nor that there is no thing 
in itself (e.g. presumably because it is merely a limiting concept). The 
position that Kant adopts in the Prolegomena is consistent with the view 
that he espouses in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant acknowl-
edges and indeed considers necessary the extramental being of things in 
themselves, which appear as and which we determine to be the empiri-
cally real objects that we experience. In the Critique, Kant speaks like-
wise of the threat of incongruity, for if we were not capable of at least 
thinking things in themselves, “the absurd proposition [would follow] 
that there is an appearance without anything that appears” (Bxxvi).16 
Apart from the conceptual absurdity of an appearance that has no 
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380     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
ground of appearing, it is clear that if there were only objects as appear-
ances, which we can cognise, but no things that are the substrate or 
ground17 of these appearances, which at various points Kant says are 
“mere representations” (e.g. B235–6/A190–1),18 then the central claim 
of TD that our representations have objective validity or objective real-
ity would not amount to much and would thus lack probative force. It 
is true that in order for representations to have objective reference, by 
being unified in an objective unity of representations, it is both neces-
sary and formally sufficient for them to be governed by the dual formal 
conditions of knowledge (the pure concepts and the pure forms of intu-
ition), which establish cognition of things merely as appearances (see 
Chap. 4). However, there still has to be a materially sufficient condition 
which grounds empirical knowledge of an actual given object that is 
more than just an object in general; and in order to cognise the actual-
ity of things perception is required, i.e. sensation, which, in our experi-
ence, is the connecting characteristic to the thing itself (B272/A225).19 
Thus, by implication, if there were not things that existed in themselves 
(in some sense) independently of our minds to which they appear, we 
would not have sensible perception, and a fortiori cognition, of things 
either. This would uproot the whole project of the analysis of knowl-
edge.20
It seems clear, then, as Adickes has demonstrated in his classic Kant 
und das Ding an sich (1924) by canvassing ample textual support in the 
First Critique, that the fact that there are in some sense things in them-
selves apart from their way of appearing to us as cognisers is never in 
doubt for Kant. However, we should be aware that
(1)  the existence of putative things in themselves can only first be deter-
mined by virtue of the application of the modal category of exist-
ence, through judgement, so that their existence is not guaranteed 
as a matter of course, as Adickes seems to believe; Bird (2006:536, 
555ff.) rightly criticises Adickes on this point, for being too quick 
in assuming the actual existence of things in themselves. However, 
Bird then wrongly concludes that Kant is not committed to the 
actual existence of things in themselves. That the conceivability of 
things in themselves does not eo ipso imply their actual existence 
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does not imply that they do not actually exist. We should distin-
guish between a general claim regarding the existential independ-
ence of things in themselves from our minds and specific claims 
regarding the fact that particular things in themselves or a singular 
thing in itself exist(s) or do(es) not exist;
(2)  by means of applying the modal category of existence it is only 
determined that a thing exists; it does not tell us anything about 
the mode in which it exists (for that at least further categories are 
needed, not least the categories of quality).
Nevertheless, though we do not know things in themselves as we 
know them in the way that they appear, we do know, by extrapolation, 
that they must exist (in some sense) independently of the manner in 
which we intuit them to be, given possible experience. (This does not 
mean that mere conceivability implies existence, but only that if we 
experience determinate appearances, things in themselves as their 
underlying ground must exist.) Strictly speaking, it is not the thing 
in itself as such that we know exists, but that of which we determine 
in judgement that it exists. Existence (as a category) is first bestowed 
upon the thing by the determinative power of the understanding; 
more accurately, the category of existence is applied to the object of 
experience, the appearance, not to the thing in itself as such. But that 
does not mean that the thing so determined does not exist mind- 
independently, nor that it is not the mind-independent thing in itself 
only that is the denizen of Being. The determination of existence in 
thought should not be conflated with de facto existence, nor should 
the de facto existence of a thing in itself be confused with the way(s) in 
which it exists or the ways in which it is determined to exist, which for 
us is only as a phenomenal object or appearance.
As has rightly been noted many times by Ameriks (e.g. 2000b) 
in response to typical objections raised first by Jacobi and then by 
champions of German Idealism, there is nothing contradictory in 
claiming to know something, in a very general sense, regarding that 
which transcends the limits of knowledge as long as we distinguish 
between kinds of cognition, only one of which yields determinate 
knowledge. Kant makes a clear distinction between thinking or 
9.2 Do the Categories Have Meaning Beyond the Bounds …     381
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 P
rp
os
es
 O
nly
382     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
conceiving, on the one hand, and knowing, on the other hand (B146); 
to put it differently, we have no “determinate knowledge” (Bestimmtes 
Wissen) of things in themselves or of “pure beings of the understanding” 
(Verstandeswesen) (Prol §32, 4:315 [Kant 1977:57]; trans. emended), 
but we can still entertain the notion of ‘thing in itself ’ without 
contradiction. One could also term this distinction as one between 
positive knowledge about things in themselves and negative knowledge 
about them (i.e. knowledge that such and such does not pertain to 
them), corresponding to Kant’s distinction between ‘noumenon’ in a 
positive and in a negative sense (in its problematic use).
So far so good. It is only at this point that the controversy starts. 
First, as Adickes, as one of the first as far as I know, pointed out 
very extensively and very clearly in the course of his aforemen-
tioned book, there is a lingering ambiguity in, on the one hand, 
holding the view, as Kant does, that the categories can have no 
meaning and do not determine any object outside of the realm 
of sensible experience and, on the other hand, believing that 
we must be able at least to think the underlying things in them-
selves that we do not cognise other than by way of cognising their 
appearance(s) and so claiming to know at least something, if only con-
ceptually (non-determinately), about some thing that transcends the 
confines of cognition. If we non-determinately know something about 
that which transcends the limits of knowledge by thinking it, then 
it would appear that at least some concepts, if not the pure concepts 
(categories), are employed in so doing. And this would imply that those 
concepts must yield some meaning and cannot be entirely without sense.
Indeed, as Kant writes in the section Phenomena and Noumena, 
“if […] I leave out all intuition, then there still remains the form of 
thinking, i.e., the way of determining an object for the manifold of a 
possible intuition” (B309/A253–4). Significantly, Kant continues, 
“the categories extend further than sensible intuition, since they think 
objects in general without seeing to the particular manner (of sensibil-
ity) in which they might be given” (cf. B150). Such passages appear 
to lend credence to the view espoused by Adams, whom I quoted in 
the beginning. The gloss we thus need to give on those passages in the 
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Critique where Kant seems to stress the lack of meaningfulness of the 
categories in abstraction from their application to sensible intuition is 
that meaning or reference (Bedeutung) must be interpreted as having 
to do with cognitive relevance in terms of yielding assertoric empirical 
knowledge (B310/A255; cf. A239/B298, A262/B318, A289/B346).21 
Lack of sense (Sinn or Bedeutung),22 then, does not mean utter con-
ceptual or semantic meaninglessness—Kant’s theory of concepts is not 
verificationist.23 Apart from their necessary empirical significance in 
the case of knowledge, categories still have general significance in terms 
of providing the concept of an object in general. As Kenneth Westphal 
rightly notes, “[i]f the categories were utterly devoid of content when 
abstracted from sensibility, there would be no difference between 
any two (alleged) categorial concepts” (2004:43).24 Furthermore, 
in abstraction from the way we cognitively determine a thing, which 
yields genuine objective knowledge, we are still able to think notion-
ally, or to have at least the notion of, the thing in itself or think up 
patently transcendent or even impossible objects (cf. A96). And in fact, 
as indicated earlier, Kant must allow this possibility if we are to talk 
sensibly about appearances as the objects of our cognition. Also, if we 
are to talk meaningfully about such prominent things in themselves as 
the moral self and God, which are objects of Kant’s primary concern 
even in the First Critique but most importantly in the practical context, 
then he cannot allow that categories (in particular, the relational cate-
gory of cause) do not apply at all to things beyond possible experience, 
that is, things in themselves, not least the noumenal self (cf. B575).25 
In general, as Kant affirms in the paragraphs following the sections of 
the Prolegomena quoted at the start of this section, although “we cannot 
[…], beyond all possible experience, form a definite notion [bestimmten 
Begrif f ] of what things in themselves may be”, we are “[y]et […] not 
at liberty to abstain entirely from inquiring into them” (Prol, 4:351 
[Kant 1977:92]).
In the next two subsections, I address the conundrum of the 
transphenomenal application of the category of substance to the 
thinking self, which particularly evinces the ambiguity of the reference 
or, in Kant’s words, the Bedeutung of the categories in general.
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384     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
9.2.1  Categories and Self-Reference
Even in a purely theoretical context the category of substance, 
say, would appear to have some significance beyond the bounds 
of sense, if only because, in abstraction from the sensible condi-
tions of empirical knowledge, we can (and must) make sense of 
the ‘I’ of transcendental apperception, which grounds theoretical 
knowledge. This ‘I’ refers to someone in particular doing the syn-
thesising—viz. the ‘I’ as a substantial thing in itself, so the noumenal 
and not the empirical self—rather than to a mere activity.26 The self- 
reference at issue in apperception concerns a consciousness of one-
self doing the action or activity of synthesising, not a mere conscious-
ness of activity in any merely general sense27; and, as Kant asserts, 
“[w]here there is action, consequently activity and force, there is also 
substance” (A204/B250).28 Of course, ‘substance’ as pure category, 
which is first derived from the ‘I’ of apperception (see Schulting 
2012), is nothing but a function that, in the context of possible 
experience, serves to determine something that is relatively permanent 
or enduring. In abstraction from sensible experience, and so apart 
from the constraints of space and time, the category is nothing but 
a logical function, which has no object, in any strict sense, for itself. 
Nevertheless, the ‘I’ of self-consciousness does point to a more 
substantial underlying nature than is manifest at the phenomenal 
level; that is, an ‘I am’ is expressed by it (B422n.; emphasis added). 
For, although one is not licensed to positively (categorically) assert 
its substantiality, the ‘I’ that exercises the act of apperception is not 
merely a function of thought that is universally applicable (the ‘I’ 
is not a universal, or, a concept strictly speaking; cf. B404/A346). 
Again, this is because a particular someone—and this someone is 
not the phenomenal self (cf. B157), which is first grounded on the 
apperceptive self—has to exercise the function of thought, albeit that 
I, being that particular someone that apperceives, cannot gain any 
direct access to my self ’s complete inner nature, not even, as I claim 
in this chapter, by merely thinking it—the access is immediately 
intuitive, not conceptual (cf. B153–9).29
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Therefore, a distinction should be heeded between, on the one 
hand, the necessary reference to an otherwise indeterminate subject 
as a particular person (i.e. a substantial thing in itself ), not a mere 
activity, in any self-conscious act of thought or act of apperception 
(the ‘I’ of apperception) and, on the other hand, the noumenal 
self itself as a putative fully determinate thing in itself that is the 
unknowable and indeterminable ground of the ‘I’ of apperception and 
to which the apperceptive ‘I’ refers.30 It is evident that the noumenal 
and the phenomenal self are not congruent, but I contend that also 
the noumenal self and the logical ‘I’ of apperception need not be, 
and probably are not, congruent (cf. A356–9). This is not to say 
that insofar as we speak of the transcendental subject no reference at 
all is thereby made to a thing in itself, i.e. the noumenal (personal) 
self.31 But what I am implying is that the transcendental subject, 
qua the logical characteristics of the thinking subject, is not, or at 
least need not be, equivalent to the noumenal (personal) self (Kant’s 
‘I’ is not a Cartesian res cogitans determined or determinable as a 
separable substance; it is merely the thinking thing as a function of 
combination manifested in discursive thought, i.e. the act of thinking 
which, to be sure, nonetheless expresses my substantial being or 
the fact that I am [B422n.]).32 However, at A492 Kant does seem 
to identify the transcendental subject with the noumenal self (cf. 
Ameriks 2000a:281).
9.2.2  The ‘Substantial’ and the Transcendental Subject
To understand the relation between the agent of thought and the self 
as substance, it might be helpful to bring to mind here Kant’s talk of 
“the substantial” (Substantiale) (B441; Prol, 4:334), which differs from 
the notion of ‘substance’ in some important ways.33 The ‘substantial’ 
is the notion of an object “which subsists, insofar as one thinks in it 
[an ihm] merely the transcendental subject without any predicates” 
(B441/A414; trans. emended). At A355–6, Kant makes it clear, regard-
ing this “transcendental subject”, that
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it is obvious that the subject of inherence is designated only transcenden-
tally through the I that is appended to thought [dem Gedanken], without 
noting the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing anything at all 
about it [oder überhaupt etwas von ihm zu kennen, oder zu wissen]. (trans. 
emended)
This transcendental subject, which is but “a something in general” 
(Etwas überhaupt), is a simple representation, as it is the concept of 
something completely undetermined. Through this ‘I’, or the transcen-
dental subject, nothing but “an absolute but logical unity of the subject” 
is thought, and through it I do not think the “real simplicity of my sub-
ject” (A356).
The ‘substantial’ as such cannot be thought, because it is that which 
is always already presupposed in whichever thoughts we have; that 
is, it is that in which inhere our thoughts or determinations, more in 
particular, the pure categories as the functions of thought. At B422, 
Kant asserts that “the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking 
them [i.e. the categories], obtain a concept of itself as an object of the 
categories”, the reason being that “in order to think them, it must take 
its pure self-consciousness, which is just what is to be explained, as its 
ground”. Similarly, at B404/A346, Kant speaks of “the simple and in 
content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot 
even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies 
every concept”. Significantly,
[t]hrough this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further 
is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = X, which is 
recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about 
which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept. (emphasis 
added)
Quite clearly, then, this “consciousness in itself [Bewußtsein an sich] is not 
even a representation distinguishing a particular object” (B404/A346). If 
I were to try to determine the properties of the thinking subject, I would 
be “turn[ing] in a constant circle”, as in doing so I would have to make 
use of it as that which accompanies all of my thoughts.
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Concluding, the absolute unity and substantiality of the thought of 
the subject, through the pure categories, do not tell us anything about 
the determinate properties of the subject as an object, as substance. 
As indicated before, it is however not at all implied that the subject of 
thought is reducible to the functional unity governing any judging, or 
is indeed mere “impersonal” activity (Keller 2001:4ff.). There is still 
enough warrant for claiming that there is a noumenal self that is the 
ultimate ground of my thinking or thoughts, which are the predicates 
that inhere in the unity of the ‘I’. It is only that, due to the nature of 
discursive thought, which is shown by the fact that I must always be able 
to accompany whichever thoughts I have with this irreducible ‘I think’, 
I cannot represent my pure thinking being as a determinate subject, “as I 
am in myself ” (B157), solely through the categories. In short, I cannot 
determine my complete, noumenal thinking self, evidently not with the 
help of the senses, but also not by any pure (rational) means.
9.3  We Can Make the “Connection” to the 
Thing in Itself “Distinct”
Coming back to the main question: what exactly do we think of the 
thing in itself if what we think of it does of course not have to do with 
the spatiotemporal properties of a fully-fledged object? Does it mean 
that by virtue of merely thinking the form of an object, without con-
sidering the way in which “we intuit [it] to be” (B59/A42), I think the 
thing as it is in itself ? Accordingly, does it mean that since the appear-
ances that are cognised are, as Kant asserts, only empirically real and 
hence transcendentally ideal because of the limiting condition of sen-
sibility, that idealism does not affect the way I might think the thing 
in abstraction from the sensible conditions of cognition so that what 
I think through the pure understanding is the transcendentally real 
thing in itself ? In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant still held the view 
that the intellect knows things as they are in themselves, such that the 
pure intellect has its proper intelligible objects, whose essences it knows 
by purely thinking them (see e.g. MSI, 2:392, 384). But this cannot be 
Kant’s position in the Critique, when we know that it was precisely the 
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role and function of the intellect with respect to objects that changed 
between the Dissertation and the Critique.
If we return to the concluding section of the Prolegomena, then 
we find a preliminary answer to the question whether we are able to 
think the thing in itself as the thing in itself proper. Kant writes that 
the relation to what lies beyond the bounds (Grenzen) of reason—he 
makes a distinction between limits (Schranken) and bounds (Grenzen), 
which always point to something positive, “whereas limits contain mere 
negations”—is a particular one, namely
an actual connection [wirkliche Verknüpfung] of a known thing [des 
Bekannten] with one quite unknown [einem völlig Unbekannten] (and 
which will always remain so), and though what is unknown should not 
become the least more known—which we cannot even hope—yet the 
notion of this connection must be definite, and capable of being rendered 
distinct. (Prol, 4:354 [Kant 1977:94–95])
Kant is clear that
as we can never cognize these beings of the understanding as they are in 
themselves, that is, determinately, yet must assume them as regards [im 
Verhältnis auf ] the sensible world and connect [verknüpfen] them with it 
by reason, we are at least able to think this connection [Verknüpfung] by 
means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense. 
(Prol, 4:355 [Kant 1977:95]; emphasis added)
What we thus think, when we try to think beyond the limits of sensibil-
ity, is the connection between what is known through the categories and 
empirical intuition and that which necessarily lies beyond it. But we do 
not think, strictly speaking, that which lies beyond it.34
9.4  Wood’s Identity Interpretation
Recently, an interesting version of the two-aspects reading of idealism has 
been advanced by Allen Wood, which he calls the Identity Interpretation 
(Wood 2005). Wood’s view epitomises the idea that Kant’s notion of 
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discursivity is separable from idealism, the view that I reject. Succinctly 
put, Wood believes that we can think the thing in itself as it is in itself. 
According to Wood, Kant’s talk of appearances and things in themselves 
concerns the same object, which is in line with Allison’s epistemological 
one-world reading, as with most other two-aspects readings. However, 
Wood (2005:65) appears to regard the distinction, not as due to two ways 
of considering but as having to do with two kinds of property of the same 
object that are being referred to (perhaps similar to Allais 2006); phenom-
enal properties are aspects of underlying things in themselves, and it is 
these aspects that we cognise through our forms of perceiving spatiotem-
poral objects. Wood contends that, although there is no identity between 
the sensible characteristics of appearances and things in themselves, there is 
identity between, on the one hand, the objects thought through the pure 
concepts of the understanding in abstraction from the sensible features of 
these objects as appearances and, on the other hand, things in themselves. 
The “fundamental point” of the identity interpretation, Wood asserts, is 
“that every appearance is identical to a thing in itself, and the distinction 
is not between two different entities but between two ways of thinking 
about or referring to the same entity” (2005:65). Regarding the thinkabil-
ity of things in themselves Wood further writes:
Although things in themselves cannot be sensed, appearances can be 
thought through the pure understanding, simply by thinking of them in 
abstraction from the ways they can appear to us. Thus while the sensible 
criterion for identity cannot apply across the gulf separating phenomena 
from noumena, the intelligible criterion can apply. […] [Kant] seems to 
regard it as entirely permissible and even inevitable that we should be able 
to think the phenomenal objects around us solely through pure concepts 
of the understanding, hence as they are in themselves. (2005:69)
We call something an appearance insofar as it can be intuited by us and 
therefore cognized through our understanding; but we can think the same 
thing while abstracting from the relation to our faculties that makes it a 
possible object of cognition. (2005:73)35
Wood’s interpretation is problematic for three main reasons. (1) It 
seems to me that Wood’s interpretation is flatly contrary to Kant’s 
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390     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
censure of Leibnizian strategies. Wood appears to do precisely that for 
which Kant criticises Leibniz. Kant writes:
[F]or him [i.e. Leibniz] appearance was the representation of the thing in 
itself, although distinguished from cognition through the understanding 
in its logical form [der logischen Form nach], since with its customary lack 
of analysis the former draws a certain mixture of subsidiary representa-
tions into the concept of the thing, from which the understanding knows 
how to abstract. (A270ff./B326ff.)
Wood, like Leibniz, intellectualises appearances, which according to 
Kant amounts to abstracting from the irreducibly sensible properties of 
appearances.
(2) Wood draws on the Leibnizian principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles,36 referring to the Amphiboly chapter in the Critique. He 
believes that Kant holds that
when objects are represented in pure understanding, the criterion to 
be used in individuating them is the Leibnizian one—the identity of 
 indiscernibles—while when they are given to us through the senses, the 
principle of their individuation is their positions in space. (Wood 2005:68;  
cf. Van Cleve 1999:149ff.)
Kant indeed asserts that if an object is presented with the same inner 
determinations, “then it is always exactly the same if it counts as an 
object of pure understanding, not many but only one thing (numer-
ica identitas)” (A263/B319). However, although what Kant says here 
holds true for the putative37 identity of a thing in itself in contrast 
to some other thing, I believe Leibniz’s principle (and Kant’s refer-
ence to it) cannot be put to use in trying to establish, as does Wood, 
the identity of the appearance—supposedly thought merely through 
the understanding—and the thing in itself,38 that is, to bridge “the 
gulf separating phenomena from noumena” (Wood 2005:69), which 
though is the main point of his identity interpretation. Incidentally, 
Wood is ambiguous as to whether the identity relation holds, on the 
one hand, between the concept or the thought of the thing in itself 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 P
rp
os
es
 O
nly
“as an object of pure understanding” and the thing in itself or, on the 
other, between the appearance and the thing in itself.39 These surely 
are not the same identity relations, although it appears that he means 
the two relations to come down to the same, for the identity is really 
between the appearance and the thing in itself, once the appearance 
has been stripped of its appearance properties. But this strikes me as 
a lot of tautological window dressing. Wood’s intention is to enable 
the conception of thinking appearances through the pure understand-
ing (2005:69), by way of abstracting from their sensible properties, but 
what he thereby effectively achieves is not establishing the identity of 
appearance and thing in itself across the conceptual gulf, but merely 
confirming the trivial truth that a thing is the same as itself and thus 
different from something else, for what is an appearance without its 
‘appearance’ features?
Moreover, I think, contrary to Wood, that Kant does not endorse 
the view, neither in the Amphiboly section nor anywhere else in the 
Critical corpus, that sheerly by virtue of Leibniz’s principle objects are 
individuated,40 even if the objects concerned are (mere) objects of pure 
understanding (whatever these amount to) or things in themselves, for 
that matter. What I should like to stress here, against Wood’s unwar-
ranted use of the textual evidence, is that Kant’s aim in his criticism of 
Leibniz is not to partly endorse Leibniz’s principle—viz. insofar as things 
in themselves are concerned (although he also does not explicitly deny 
its applicability in that restricted case41)—but rather to point out that 
Leibniz’s principle is to no avail for acquiring knowledge of objects of 
any sort, since “pure concepts of the understanding yield no knowledge 
on their own” (FM, 20:280 [Kant 2002:371]); for only in the catego-
ries’ schematisation to sensible experience is cognition of objects stricte 
dicta first possible. This is the reason why Kant writes that “that puta-
tive law [Leibniz’s principle, D.S.] is no law of nature” but “simply an 
analytical rule or comparison of things through mere concepts” (A272/
B328).42
(3) Wood’s assumption of the possibility of thinking things through 
the pure understanding is based on a mistaken conception of what a 
pure concept of an object or “an object of pure understanding” amounts 
to. He appears to conflate the pre-Critical and Critical views of the 
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intellect’s relation to objects. As I pointed out earlier, the pure concept 
of an object is constrained by the limits of discursive thought as much 
as our sensible intuition of an object is constrained by the forms of 
space and time. This means that one is not licensed to argue that for 
the Critical Kant things in themselves satisfy the conditions under 
which objects are thought (i.e. the intellectual conditions).43 As a result 
of this, a disparity exists between the object of pure understanding, 
which is a mere transcendental object and constrained by the a priori 
concepts that come with discursivity, and the thing in itself. This 
disparity cannot be bridged by means of any speculative attempt of 
putting to use metaphysical principles (e.g. Leibniz’s identity principle). 
Nevertheless, at A249, quoted by Wood (2005:65), Kant seems to 
suggest that the thing in itself is the object of the understanding, 
which is the object of “a cognition […] in which no sensibility is 
encountered” and which would refer to a different “world” (a mundus 
[…] intelligibilis) (A249), “a world thought in spirit (perhaps also even 
intuited)” (A250). However, first, Kant argues that it would here, in the 
same passage, concern an object of a non-sensible intuition; earlier he 
refers to intellectual intuition. Clearly, Kant hypothesises here about a 
pure employment of the understanding, that is, about “a pure and yet 
objectively valid [use of the categories]”. But he soon makes it clear that 
the object to which “through the understanding” our representations are 
“in fact related” is indeed “only the transcendental object”, a
something = X, of which we know nothing at all nor can know 
anything in general (in accordance with the current constitution of our 
understanding), but is rather something that can serve only as a correlate 
of the unity of apperception for the unity of the manifold in sensible 
intuition, by means of which the understanding unifies that [dasselbe, i.e. 
the manifold, D.S.] in the concept of an object. (A250)44
Significantly, then, the transcendental object is nothing in abstraction 
from sensibility (cf. A277/B333; A109). Kant continues:
This transcendental object cannot even be separated from the sensible 
data, for then nothing would remain through which it would be thought. 
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It is therefore no object of cognition in itself [Gegenstand der Erkenntnis 
an sich selbst] […] Just for this reason, then, the categories do not represent 
any special object given to the understanding alone, but rather serve only to 
determine the transcendental object (the concept of something in gen-
eral) through that which is given in sensibility, in order thereby to cognize 
appearances empirically under concepts of objects. (A250–1; emphasis 
added)
This gainsays Wood’s contention that through the pure use of the 
understanding, through mere concepts, we are able to think the thing in 
itself as it is, for clearly, as Kant notes, the “categories do not represent 
any special object given to the understanding alone”. The thing in itself, 
i.e. “that which is given in sensibility”, is only indirectly related to the 
understanding. The concept of a noumenon results from the “thinking 
of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intu-
ition”. Does this mean that I thus represent a pure object, i.e. the thing 
as it is in itself ? No. Kant insists:
[I]n order for a noumenon to signify a true object, to be distinguished 
from all phenomena, it is not enough that I liberate my thoughts from all 
conditions of sensible intuition, but I must in addition have ground to 
assume another kind of intuition than this sensible one, under which such 
an object could be given; for otherwise my thought is empty, even though 
free of contradiction. […] [A]lthough our thinking can abstract from that 
sensibility, the question still remains whether it is not then a mere form of a 
concept and whether any object at all is left over after this separation. The 
object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, i.e., 
the entirely undetermined thought of something in general. This cannot be 
called the noumenon; for I do not know anything about what it is in itself ; 
and have no concept of it except merely that of the object of a sensible 
intuition in general […]. I cannot think it through any categories. (A252; 
emphasis added; cf. B306–7)
For the Critical Kant, the pure (unschematised) concept of an object 
does not map, one to one, onto the thing in terms of its in-itself nature. 
In fact, the pure concept of an object does not have or refer to any par-
ticular object or thing for itself. Kant clearly links this limiting fact to 
9.4 Wood’s Identity Interpretation     393
Fo
r S
c
lar
ly 
Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
394     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
the nature of the functions of our discursive thought. He writes towards 
the end of the Amphiboly section:
If by merely intelligible objects we understand those things that are 
thought through pure categories, without any schema of sensibility, then 
things of this sort are impossible. For the condition of the objective use 
of all our concepts of the understanding is merely the manner of our 
sensible intuition, through which objects are given to us, and, if we 
abstract from the latter, then the former have no relation at all to any sort 
of object. Indeed, even if one would assume another sort of intuition than 
this our sensible one, our functions for thinking would still be without 
any significance in regard to it. (B342/A286; emphasis added)
This, as Kant continues, does not exclude the problematic notion of a 
noumenon, that is, noumenon in the negative sense, but we cannot
assume beyond appearances objects of pure thinking, i.e., noumena [in 
the positive sense, D.S.], since those do not have any positive significance 
that can be given. […] Thinking in itself, to be sure, is not a product of 
the senses, and to this extent is also not limited by them, but it is not on 
that account immediately of any independent and pure use, without assistance 
from sensibility, for it is in that case without an object. (B343/A287; 
emphasis added)
There cannot be a positive argument to the effect that we may infer 
that, when we abstract from the sensible constraints of the knowledge of 
an object, there obtains an identity between the object thought through 
the pure concepts and a putative thing in itself, “[f ]or one must con-
cede that the categories alone are not sufficient for the cognition of 
things in themselves [allein noch nicht zur Erkenntnis der Dinge an sich 
zureichen]” (B343/A287). This is Kant’s clearest statement regarding the 
alleged possibility of thinking, through the categories, things in them-
selves (cf. also B306–7). The pure concept of an object is nothing but 
the set of the purely logical characteristics which make up that concept, 
i.e. the categories; and, as we also know from Kant’s arguments in the 
Paralogisms regarding the nature of the self (see again above Sect. 9.2), 
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these do not determine an object for themselves (in abstraction from 
sensibility).
Wood crucially neglects the difference between the pre-Critical 
concept of an object (whereby, as I said earlier, the Kant of the 
Dissertation indeed holds that the intellect cognises the intelligi-
ble object) and the Critical concept of an object which may be said 
to correspond to a noumenon in a negative sense only. The pure 
understanding of an object (or an appearance) is not isomorphically 
related, and a fortiori identical, to a thing in itself by way of its mere 
intellectual grasp, by merely entertaining the notion of a thing in itself 
or by abstracting from the appearance properties of an object. This 
means that, strictly speaking, things in themselves cannot even be 
thought as such in any objectively significant, determinate sense.45 What 
is thought about a thing in itself is merely the noumenon in a nega-
tive sense—i.e. empty concepts, or at least concepts without any pos-
itive ontological reference, or Bedeutung as Kant would say. The 
positive content of our thoughts of things in themselves consists, as 
Kant pointed out in the Prolegomena passage quoted earlier (Sect. 9.3 
above), merely of (analogical) relations or “connections” between our 
knowledge and what lies beyond its limits, what is “quite unknown”.
As a run-up to discussing those aspects of the transcendental Ideal cen-
tral to the topic of this chapter, I now turn to a brief rehearsal of the main 
argument of the TD, in particular the element of objective determination.
9.5  Objective Determination in TD
As we have seen in detail in Chap. 4, in TD Kant expounds the 
necessary conditions which must be satisfied to enable the sense of 
an object as object, which at the same time enables the experience of 
such an object (B197; A111). Kant asserts, controversially, that this 
dual possibility—that is, the possibility of the experience of an object 
and the possibility of an object itself, of objectivity simpliciter—is 
grounded in one unconditional subjective principle, which he calls the 
principle of transcendental apperception (the thesis of Kant’s radical 
9.5 Objective Determination in TD     395
Fo
r S
ho
lar
ly 
Pu
rp
os
s O
nly
396     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
subjectivism). This principle is transcendental self-consciousness 
insofar as it concerns the thinking or judging subject who is conscious 
of her own representations, which she regards as her own and as such 
apperceives or takes as belonging together. It is the central claim of 
TD that the form in which transcendental apperception—in that it is 
the pure function constitutive of discursive thought—determines the 
logical relation of concepts in general, is also the necessary form in 
which it gives unity to the manifold of representations in an intuition, 
representations which in some way are related to the thing that is 
perceived and judged about in any arbitrary determinative judgement 
a is F. This central idea is expressed most fundamentally and succinctly 
in the so-called Leitfaden passage (A79/B104–5). This is not the place 
to expand on the perplexing issues surrounding this controversial 
passage, which concern the way how the Leitfaden should be read 
in regard to deriving the categories from the forms of judgement and 
how the deduction of the categories in TD ties in with the former.46 
What is important to emphasise here is that insofar as the unitary 
form of the intuited object, by means of a synthetic unity of the 
representations that one has, is determined as such in the unifying act 
of transcendental apperception, one is licensed to say that the set of 
functions of transcendental self-consciousness—the “same function” of 
which Kant speaks in the Leitfaden passage—which are the rules for the 
unity of consciousness, is the original, subjective ground of knowledge 
itself, that is, of objectively valid cognition. Indeed, transcendental self-
consciousness is the very ground or, as Kant says in a Reflexion from the 
1770s, the “original” of an object in general.47
It is for this reason that Kant calls the principle of self-consciousness 
the original-synthetic principle of apperception (subheading §16), for 
it is both the ground of the conceptual form of a judgement, which is 
established by means of an analytic unity of the representations in their 
purely conceptual relation of subordination, and the ground of the 
unity of a manifold of representations in an empirical intuition. The 
original synthesis of apperception grounds, in one act, both the analytic 
and synthetic unity of representations, by whose complex relation a 
judgement is characterised. To put it succinctly, a judgement is an 
objective unity of representations, whereby ‘objective’ should be seen in 
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terms of a qualitative unity that is established by the synthetic function 
that grounds both analytic and synthetic unities of representations. So 
when Kant claims that this objective unity of apperception, which is 
the definition of judgement, is the ground of our concept of an object, 
and thus constitutes an object (B137), “not merely something I myself 
need in order to cognize an object but rather something under which 
every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me” (B138), 
he makes a claim to having established not merely the necessary 
conditions for the object to be an object of experience or thought, but 
also the sufficient condition for the object to be an object for me (at 
least formally). Object is a function of judgement.
Obviously, as Kant affirms and as we saw earlier in Sect. 9.2 above 
and more in detail in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10, we do not produce the thing 
as to its existence (“dem Dasein nach”; A92/B125; B72), in the same 
way that one may say, a bit awkwardly perhaps, that judgement ‘pro-
duces’ the object qua its necessary form, viz. as an object in general. We 
should further notice that the concept of an object, even if only in very 
general terms, can be made concrete only if we explain subsequently the 
necessary application of the set of functions, the categories, that make 
up the concept of an object, to appearances in an empirical intuition. 
Concrete knowledge stricte dicta is only possible when the categories are 
schematised.48
On account of the probative force of the argument in TD Kant limits 
the domain of possible knowledge, and hence the domain of what we 
determine to be an object. What can be analytically shown to be an 
object for cognition eo ipso determines what cannot be so shown. The 
object, as object, is only knowable to the extent that the categories are 
applied to sensible intuition and regard the phenomenally substantial 
thing in space and time. The thing that is determined as the object of 
our judgement is ex hypothesi not the thing as it may be apart from the 
very general categorial properties that it must have if it is to be an object 
of our judgement.49 That implies that, though the categories provide 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowledge of an object 
in general, they do not provide us with the sufficient conditions for the 
knowledge of any particular existent thing as an individual. The only 
access that we have to the existing thing appears to be the a posteriori 
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398     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
determinable sensations that are the result of the thing’s affecting our 
sense organs (and hence our minds) (cf. again B72), which prompts the 
occurrence of representations in our mind. Kant’s distinction between 
appearance and thing in itself is thus not the arbitrary distinction for 
which it is often lambasted, but issues from the very conceptual limits of 
discursively determining the properties of a putative individual. We just 
cannot know what the properties of a thing as it is in itself, as individual, 
could be, unless we encountered them in an empirical experience or else 
they mysteriously “migrate[d] into my faculty of representation” (Prol 
§9, 4:282)—but notice that Kant dismisses even the possibility of the a 
posteriori cognition of the properties of a thing in itself.
Put differently, even though by means of judgement we are fully 
capable of determining, through the forms of the understanding and 
intuition, the very general properties that any particular object must 
have, and so indicate its formally necessary and sufficient conditions 
if it is to be an object of our knowledge, we cannot possibly syntheti-
cally grasp all of its possible properties, even essential ones, that make 
up the particular thing’s essence—what makes it an individual, a thing 
in itself. Given the nature of our discursive form of thought, it is not 
possible, for a given empirical judgement (in experience) nor in a con-
secutive series of empirical judgements, to exhaustively determine 
the thing that we judge about. A judgement is always a relative posit-
ing of predicates which to be sure can be linked with other predicates, 
through syllogistic reasoning, indefinitely, such that our knowledge of 
the object of our judgements gradually increases (a procedure for which 
the practice of science is paradigmatic). Only to the extent that under 
the conditions of an identical apperceiving subject of judgement—the 
self-conscious representer—a unity has been brought into the manifold 
of representations in a “certain intuition” (B132), as Kant says, one can 
say that one knows an object, that is, the something in general = X (the 
transcendental object [A109]50), which is the correlate of the unity of 
my representations (cf. A251). This means that only those representa-
tions that, at any given time, are occurrently apprehended by the judger 
determine an object for her judgement. For example, I judge that some 
x is ‘oblong’ and ‘flat’ and not that I judge that e.g. it is ‘rust-encrusted’ 
and ‘bulky’, which are also possible predicates attributable to the object 
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of my current judgement, e.g. the large steel plate that I perceive and 
about which I judge that it is oblong and flat—suppose, while abstract-
ing from the aesthetic connotations and being a welder by profession, I 
am gazing at one of Richard Serra’s massive constructions. For any series 
of predicates attributed to the transcendental object of one’s judgement, 
in this case, the large steel plate that I perceive outside me, a synthesis 
must be performed in order to bring any of a series of possible predi-
cates into a unity with all other predicates attributed.51 The synthesis of 
a set of predicates constitutes the object qua object of my judgement. 
This is what is meant by the idea that an object is always only a function 
of judgement, which makes the object of my judgement an ideal object.
This is all very general and needs elaborating, something I do in 
Schulting (2012) (see also Chaps. 2–4, this volume). What I am going 
to do next is to concentrate on one class of categories in particular, 
i.e. the categories of quality (reality, negation and limitation), in the 
context of my theme of the relation between subjectivity and idealism. 
It is these categories that make it clear that the categories are only 
“serviceable” in regard to objects of experience, that is, phenomenal 
objects, and not in regard to intelligible or noumenal objects (B344/
A288). Simply put, these categories make it clear that I cannot even 
have, through the pure understanding, a definite notion of a thing in 
itself. To connect this even more intimately to the issue of idealism, 
in the next section I address relevant aspects of Kant’s account of the 
prototypon transcendentale in the Transcendental Dialectic, where he 
speaks of the ‘thing in itself ’ in its proper metaphysical context.
9.6  On Another Kind of A Priori Synthesis: 
Material Synthesis and the “Sum Total 
of All Possibility”
In the third chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, 
which is about the Ideal of pure reason and forms the transition to the 
critique of the proofs of God’s existence, Kant provides what I believe 
is the key to a proper understanding of the relation between the object 
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400     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
as a phenomenon or appearance and the thing in itself, and thus of the 
putative possibility of thinking, through the pure categories, the latter. 
There, Kant explains that a thing in itself is an individual (individuum) 
in terms of a metaphysical or ontological substrate, which is completely 
or thoroughly determined. This concerns the ground of the object that 
is determined through the categories of the understanding and the 
forms of intuition (notice again that, for Kant, the object of experience, 
the appearance, is not an individual, although at A582/B610 he does 
appear to suggest otherwise).
We saw earlier, in Chap. 4, that the conditions of the possible 
experience of an object are at the same time the conditions of the 
possibility of the object of experience (B197/A158; A111), for unlike 
things in themselves objects depend entirely on possible experience 
for their being objects (cf. FM, 20:274). The principle of possible 
experience of objects is analytic (B135) and hence, from the probative 
force of the analysis of the concept of an object, the limits of what 
can be determined as object are thereby defined. Now the non-trivial 
analytical principle that, by means of an underlying a priori synthesis 
(B135), establishes the determination of the form of an object (i.e. the 
object for us; A582/B610), which is grounded on a priori synthesis, 
rests itself on a further synthesis of a particular kind. At A578/B606 Kant 
speaks of a “synthesis of the manifold in respect of its content” (trans. 
Kemp Smith; emphasis added) as concerning “all the possibility of 
things” (cf. B600). This synthesis, unlike the synthesis brought about 
by the synthetic act of the understanding regarding the manifold of 
intuition, is a “sum total of all possibility” (Inbegriﬀ aller Möglichkeit) 
(A573/B601) or an “all of reality” (All der Realität) (A576/B604). 
Significantly, Kant also speaks of the “material for all possibility” 
(Materie zu aller Möglichkeit) (A573/B601, trans. emended; cf. A267/
B323).52
This means that the a priori necessary form of the object of knowl-
edge or experience presupposes, logically, that the matter which grounds 
the very knowledge of an object, that is, that without which it would 
not be possible in the first place to have a priori synthetic knowl-
edge of an object, is transcendentally given (it concerns certain “data”; 
A573/B601).53 We are not talking here about the de facto givenness 
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of sensations, which are the concrete empirical matter or content of an 
appearance (B34/A20), that is, the empirically given, but about the tran-
scendentally given matter (“transcendental matter”; A143/B182), which 
corresponds in some way to the sensations that are the empirically given 
content of appearances. Thus, the transcendental form of an object pre-
supposes, insofar as the object’s real possibility is concerned, the tran-
scendental content or matter of the thing that is being determined as the 
object of experience. It is this transcendentally given matter which makes 
the thing materially possible. This matter is that which individuates the 
thing underlying the object of experience as what it is qua thing, qua 
individual. It concerns the “complete material condition of its possibil-
ity” (vollständige materiale Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit) (A576/B604).54 
The forms of the understanding, the categories, together with the forms 
of intuition alone cannot satisfy this material enabling condition.
How can this condition of material possibility be further charac-
terised? The application of concepts to objects rests essentially on the 
principle of excluded middle (principium exclusi tertii, i.e. PET), which 
comes down to the principle that for any arbitrary predicate F either F 
or ¬F be attributed to the object.55 This principle, which is the mini-
mally required condition for knowledge of objects, hangs together with 
the principle of determination or more precisely “the principle of deter-
minability” (Grundsatze der Bestimmbarkeit) (A571/B599), which states 
that of each predicate F a further predicate G can be predicated (cf. 
Chap. 3). That is, each given predicate F is further determinable by at 
least one of two contradictorily opposed predicates G or ¬G.
However, as Kant writes at B601, when we are concerned with 
something that exists, a thing rather than a predicate alone, there is 
not just a logical determination of predicates, whereby of each given 
pair of opposed predicates always only one can be predicated (F or 
¬F), but also of a transcendental comparison of the thing itself with 
all of its possible predicates, that is, a real determination of the thing 
in relation to all possible predicates or, more exactly, properties that 
essentially belong to it. In this case, for all possible predicates F, each F 
or its contradictorily opposed ¬F must be predicated, for things that are 
the objects of predication, rather than mere predicates, are thoroughly 
determined individuals. It concerns the existing object qua its ‘being’ 
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or essence (qua its thinghood, A574/B603), thus the existing object 
as thing in itself, which if we were to know it completely, and thus in 
itself, we would know in terms of all its possible predicates or properties. 
More precisely, as Longuenesse writes,
[i]f one could have cognition of the exhaustive division of the ‘infinite 
sphere of all possible determinations’, and could exhaustively specify 
all the subspheres to which the thing belongs and to which it does not 
belong, then one would know the thing in its complete determination 
and, thus, as the individual thing it is. (1998:295)
The determination of a concept falls under the generality (universalitas) 
of the principle of non-contradiction PNC (and, equally, PET; A572/
B600n.).56 But the determinability of a thing, qua its ‘being’, falls 
under totality (universitas) or the “sum total” (Inbegriﬀ ) of all possible 
predicates predicable of it (see B600n.), i.e. all of its attributable prop-
erties. This totality or “sum total” of all possible predicates or proper-
ties—Kant also calls it “the whole of possibility” (gesamte Möglichkeit) 
at A572/B600—must be understood in terms of a maximally possible 
increase of determinacy. That is to say, one must see it as a standard 
or exemplar of a completely determined individual, not in terms of a 
mere aggregate or set of predicates. This standard is exactly applicable 
to one thing, which Kant calls the “Ideal of pure Reason” (B602).57 
Only in this case, that is, in the case of a thing in itself (B604), is the 
thing completely determined and do its concepts or predicates apply 
to their object fully. To put it differently, in the case of a thing in itself, 
its concept fully corresponds to it; there is no longer a discrepancy 
between the determinacy of the thing and its determinate concept. In 
the case of a thing in itself, it is therefore also not apt to distinguish 
between the metaphysical and epistemological senses of its ‘deter-
mination’, because in this case (and this case only) the epistemic and 
ontological determinations coincide—or, the logical predication is not 
distinguishable from the attribution of properties to the thing itself.
This idea of an exemplar of a completely determined individual is of 
course neither an empirical concept nor a concept of the understand-
ing (a category, or even the set of categories), which would effectively 
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represent it through an empirical intuition, or purely through concepts 
alone—even though it is true to say that a thing that is the object of 
judgement falls under the category of totality,58 which makes the deter-
minate appearance of the thing a relatively individuated whole of per-
ceptions, i.e. an empirical object that is distinguishable from other 
empirical objects (cf. A582/B610).
The concept of a thing in the metaphysical sense—viz. a thing 
realiter, a Sache—rests on the metaphysical principle of thoroughgo-
ing determination (principium omnimodae determinationis; henceforth 
POD).59 POD is the metaphysical principle of the individuation of 
things.60 This principle, which concerns the logically material (not: 
empirical) content of determinative knowledge, must be seen in con-
nection with “a common correlate” (B600n.), which is the collective 
possible predicates attributable to the thing, that is, any possible thing 
about which one judges. The thoroughly determined thing or individ-
ual, which concerns the collective possible predicates attributable to a 
thing,
is a transcendental ideal which is the ground of the thoroughgoing deter-
mination that is necessarily encountered in everything existing, and 
which constitutes the supreme and complete material condition of its 
possibility, to which all thinking of objects in general must, as regards the 
content of that thinking, be traced back. (A576/B604)
In other words, in any determination of an object by the understand-
ing, the individual as transcendental Ideal of a thing in itself is always 
already presupposed as metaphysical ground. More in particular, the 
actuality of an object as appearance (determined in virtue of the sche-
matised categories) is grounded upon a disjunction of the set of actu-
ally attributed predicates from the greater set of all the object’s possible 
predicates, that is, the predicates or properties that it possesses as indi-
vidual or thing in itself. The determination of an actual object in fact 
occurs by means of the category of limitation, which is the combina-
tion of the categories of reality and negation—a thing is determined 
through negation, which results in a limitation of the transcendentally 
given reality.61
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The thing in itself is in fact the collective possible predicates predi-
cable of, or the collective possible properties attributable to, it. That is, 
a thing in itself is the whole of all predicates that can be determined of 
the thing that essentially possesses those predicates, that is, when seen 
(idealiter) as a thoroughly determined individual. Any actually existing 
thing is eo ipso a thing in itself, i.e. a thoroughly determined individual. 
There is nothing besides the whole of all its possible predicates that the 
thing in itself is, in addition to its predicates. It is a realist mistake—
often made—to think that there is an unbridgeable gulf between what 
the thing in itself is ontologically (qua its ontological determinacy), and 
how it would be epistemically determined in judgement if it were thor-
oughly determined, namely as an individual with all of its properties. If 
all possible epistemic determinations of a thing have been given, then 
the entirety of its determinations, its complete determinacy, is the thing 
ontologically; that is, the complete determinacy of a thing corresponds 
to its being that particular thing with all its properties. No gap exists 
between a thing and its complete (ontological) determination, though, 
as I argue here, there is an unbridgeable one between it and any single 
(epistemic) determination or finite series of such determinations.
Call epistemic determination ‘ε-determination’ to distinguish it 
from ontological determination or determinacy, which henceforth is 
called ‘ο-determination’ or ‘ο-determinacy’ (ο standing for omicron). 
An ε-determination concerns the logical predication of a subject 
(A6–7/B10–11), whose substratum (x) is determined as referring 
to an object of empirical cognition (a determinate appearance), 
whereas ο-determination or ο-determinacy concerns the possession of 
properties by a thing.62 Now, as said, there is no discrepancy between 
the thing metaphysically speaking, as having all of its properties, and 
its thoroughly determined concept. In other words, concept and thing 
truly correspond, or the putative ε-determination and ο-determination 
coincide, just in case the thing in itself is a thoroughly determined 
individual and one were indeed able to ε-determine the thing in 
itself completely. A thing’s ο-determination is thus the complete 
set of all possible ε-determinations attributable to it. However, this 
does not imply that the ε-determination or set of ε-determinations in 
any given particular empirical judgement or series of such judgements 
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about some arbitrary object x for my judgement, coincides with 
the thing in itself underlying x. Any single ε-determination or 
finite set of ε-determinations of x is not identical to the set of all x’s 
possible ε-determinations, after all. From the perspective of empirical 
judgement, it is therefore correct to distinguish strictly between the 
ε-determination of x and its ο-determination. It would though be 
a mistake to think that, in the Kantian transcendental context, an 
ε-determination of x is merely a justified true belief about x at best, 
but not yet knowledge of x (see Chaps. 3, 4). The ε-determination of 
an empirical object, by means of the categories, truly corresponds to 
the actual object so determined, albeit that the object so determined is 
not a thing in itself (see Chap. 4)63; this latter proviso makes perfectly 
logical sense, since, as said, an actual ε-determination or finite set 
of actual ε-determinations does not correspond to the totality of all 
possible ε-determinations, or, the complete (ontological) determinacy 
or ο-determination of a thing, which is Kant’s definition of a thing in 
itself.
Yet, later on in Sect. 9.8, we shall see that, in Kant’s theory of pos-
sible experience, not even all possible ε-determinations of objects as 
appearances in fact correspond to the ο-determinacy or ο-determination 
of a thing in itself. There is thus an unbridgeable discrepancy between, 
on the one hand, all possible ε-determinations of objects of possible 
experience—“the totality [Inbegriﬀ ] of all objects of experience”—and, 
on the other, all possible predicates or the ο-determination of the thing in 
itself. But recall that ε-determination and ο-determination do coincide, 
just in case the thing in itself is completely determined, which though is 
logically impossible for us to achieve, as will become clear.
As said earlier, the determination of a thing—which, for us, comes 
down to an ε-determination of an actual object—occurs by means of 
the categories of quality, in particular the category of ‘limitation’. The 
appearances as objects of possible experience are as it were ectypa, copies 
or negations, of the prototype (prototypon) that the thing in itself is, and 
from which they take their “matter [Stoﬀ ] for their possibility” (A578/
B606). This matter must be transcendentally affirmed, by means of the 
category ‘reality’, for what is effectively determined as the object of cog-
nition to be an existing thing at all; it gives the object its thinghood, 
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its reality sensu stricto (B602). Wolfram Hogrebe speaks aptly of the 
“predicative protoplasm” (prädikative Protoplasma) or also the “proto-
object” (Protogegenstand ), or likewise, with a hint of Heideggerian 
etymology, the “dugout of all objects of predication” (Unterstand aller 
Gegenstände der Prädikation) (Hogrebe 1989:63, 65).
Objective ε-determination of a thing thus occurs by means of the 
categories of quality, in particular, through a negation of the thinghood 
or reality of a thing in its complete determinacy, which amounts to a 
limitation of the sum total of all its possible predicates, i.e. a limitation 
of transcendental matter (B111: “[L]imitation is nothing other than 
reality combined with negation.”).64 Anneliese Maier circumscribes 
this graphically by saying that “by means of limits or negations we 
mould, as it were, the manifold of finite objects from the infinite 
totality of reality [All der Realität]” (Maier 1930:41). This limitation of 
the transcendental matter (of the illimitatum, as it were, of the all or 
totality of reality) determines the unitary manifold of sensations, which 
constitutes the realitas phaenomenon or the matter of appearances that is 
the result of the thing in itself affecting our sensibility and is effectively 
determined through the category of reality.
Kant asserts that “transcendental negation”, which is nothing as such 
or “not-being in itself ” and as such indicates a “lack”, is logically pre-
ceded by “transcendental affirmation”, which expresses Being itself 
(A574–5/B602–3). Being is always already transcendentally affirmed, 
which does not mean that, per impossibile, the existence of any arbitrary 
object or thing is affirmed before the existence of the object or thing 
is determined in a judgement (see Sect. 9.2). The Being meant here 
is reality simpliciter, not phenomenal reality, which is first the result 
of the application of the category of reality in any arbitrary empirical 
judgement. The Being that is transcendentally affirmed in an objective 
ε-determination by virtue of the negative quality inherent to judge-
ment is “reality (thinghood) […] through [which] alone […] are objects 
Something (things)” (A574/B602).65 Transcendental affirmation con-
cerns the Being that is affirmed in any arbitrary logical predication, 
irrespective of it being a logically affirmative or negative predication S 
is P, or, S is not P, respectively, given that these judgements concern 
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empirical judgements about objects of experience. Transcendental affir-
mation means that the something = x of predication—the x underly-
ing the subject predicate in either S is P or S is not P as judgements 
about objects—is determined as a “Something”, as a really existing 
thing, while a transcendental negation indicates a denying or negating 
of this Something, that is, a “lack” (A574–5/B602–3), or, a non-exist-
ence (notice that transcendental negation is not negation as category, 
which is in fact the determination as such in either affirmative or nega-
tive empirical judgements).66 Any and all judgements about an object, 
whether negative or affirmative, rest on a transcendental affirmation.
9.7  Determination, Judgement and the Thing 
in Itself
At this point, the question might arise as to whether in determin-
ing an object of experience, by means of ε-determination, we in fact 
attribute (or not) a predicate to the thing in itself that appears to us. 
Are the predicates that are being attributed to a thing, in a judgement, 
the properties of the very thing in itself ? This is important to know, as 
one would expect a determinative judgement to result in the determina-
tion of the thing judged about. That is to say, are the predicates I attrib-
ute to the object of my judgement aspects or properties of the thing 
that I judge about in terms of a thing in itself, or merely in terms of an 
appearance? Are the properties that I determine to belong to the thing 
that I judge about, really also properties of the thing in itself qua thing 
in itself if as per Kant’s restriction thesis what I can determine of the 
thing can only be its appearance properties?
In answering these questions, we must first note again that Kant’s 
theory of judgement is not a theory of ontological predication 
(see Chap. 3). Contrary to Wolff and others in the School metaphysics, 
Kant rejects the view that predicates relate directly to the thing (or the 
Sache) about which is judged that it is so and so (cf. A68/B93) or that 
we would be able to apply in a judgement a conceptus infimus which 
would determine the individual completely (cf. A655ff./B683ff.).67 
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Kant denies that there can be singular concepts, for we have no notion 
of the lowest species (Log, 9:59, 97). This means that whatever predi-
cates I apply to the object of my judgement, by means of the applica-
tion of the categories to the object of my empirical intuition, they never 
apply to the thing in itself qua thing in itself (cf. A358–9)—namely, in 
terms of the thoroughly determined individual, or the complete set of 
its possible predicates. This follows from the fact that, as we saw before, 
ε-determination does not map isomorphically onto ο-determination.
Likewise, analytic judgements, which do not depend on the 
schematisation of categories to empirical intuitions, do not determine 
things in themselves. James Van Cleve is therefore mistaken, when he 
states the following:
An upholder of Kant’s system must […] either admit that the pure cat-
egories do apply to things in themselves, or else maintain that things in 
themselves are never the subject matters of any true judgments. But the sen-
tence I just italicized expresses a negative and universal judgment; if the 
sentence is true, the corresponding pure categories must have application 
to things in themselves. (Van Cleve 1999:138)
Van Cleve is mistaken, for neither in this case do the categories have 
application in the sense that they would determine things in them-
selves qua things in themselves. The predicate in Van Cleve’s italicised 
sentence is only predicated of the subject concept <things in themselves>, 
not of the thing in itself or things in themselves that would be the 
underlying real substrate of this concept if the judgement were objec-
tively valid. The italicised sentence is not an objectively valid judgement, 
but merely a logically valid (and as it happens, false) statement. As I 
showed in Chap. 3, the objective validity of a judgement should not be 
confused with its truth value. So the truth (or falsity) of a judgement 
does not imply that the judgement is or is not objectively valid. Analytic 
judgements are examples of judgements that can be true or false, but are 
not ipso facto objectively valid, in the sense of referring to objectively 
real objects.
This is the case with the example that Van Cleve uses. As with any 
other judgement, the substrate is a transcendental object, an x, for 
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which in this particular case—the subject being the concept <things in 
themselves>—there is ex hypothesi no experience possible, hence no 
ε-determination, and a fortiori no real application of the categories. It 
is perfectly possible to formulate judgements (more accurately, proposi-
tions) about the concept <thing in itself>, but it is never possible to actu-
ally apply categories so as to determine the thing in itself de re. In other 
words, it is not possible to make synthetic, objectively valid judgements 
about things in themselves qua things in themselves (rather than just 
analytic statements about the concept <things in themselves>).
Although in a judgement about an object a truth-value is necessarily 
attached to the relation between concept and thing,68 as also in the 
case of Van Cleve’s example, the resulting correspondence is not a one-
to-one or immediate relation between the predicates in a proposition 
and the properties of the thing qua thing in itself. This means that the 
determinate object of judgement is not numerically the same as the 
transcendental substratum (the thing in itself properly speaking), out 
of which by means of limitation the determinacy of the object judged 
about is ‘carved’, as it were (cf. Maier 1930:41, quoted above). The 
determinate object of judgement is by implication not numerically 
identical to the thing in itself as the thoroughly determined individual, 
for although in judgement I do determine, by virtue of ε-determination, 
the thing that is the substrate (the transcendental object = x) of my 
judgement, what I determine of it concerns only the modes in which 
it appears to me, mediated by the forms of space and time, never the 
thing in itself qua thing in itself, not even if I abstracted from the 
appearance properties (spatiotemporality). Determinations, that is, 
ε-determinations, relate to the thing as accidents relate to substance (cf. 
A186/B229).
That which, in an ε-determination, I attribute to a thing is the prop-
erty of the thing itself, but only insofar as the thing appears to me, as 
an object in space and time and as such as the particular object of 
my judging with such and such properties, namely as a transcenden-
tal object = x underlying the subject in a proposition that has certain 
predicates—not as thing in itself, namely, as the individual with all 
of its possible predicates. Thus, the determination that I give to the 
thing, in judgement, is strictly speaking an ε-determination of it qua 
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appearance, for me, not as thing in itself.69 This is not an arbitrary 
thought on Kant’s part, but follows analytically from the constraints of 
discursive judgement, which sees ε-determination in terms of a catego-
rial limitation of the totality of possible predicates applicable to an x 
about which one makes a judgement (a ‘carving out of ’ its ontologi-
cal determinacy or ο-determination). Put differently, the property or 
set of properties determined by virtue of ε-determination is only one 
or a subset of the complete set of all possible properties of the thing in 
terms of its complete ontological determinacy or ο-determination. It 
would of course in fact be impossible, that is, logically contradictory, 
that any single or finite series of predicates or ε-determinations that is 
predicated or determined of the thing, in a judgement, would corre-
spond one-to-one, in a numerically identical fashion, to the complete 
set of all possible predicates or ο-determination, which define the thing 
in itself as thoroughly determined individual. Therefore, a predica-
tion F of a thing (an x) cannot be an attribution of F to the thing qua 
thing in itself, though F is of course one of the possible predicates that 
define the thing in itself. In idealist terms, an attribution, by means of 
ε-determination, of F to a thing (x) is an attribution of F to the thing 
(x) as appearance, F being just one predicate from among the totality 
of all possible predicates predicable of x, which as and only as totality 
refers to the thing in itself.
Notice that, although my reading might seem close to a metaphysi-
cal two-aspect reading, it cannot in fact be labelled thus, for I reject any 
numerical identity between the thing in itself qua thing in itself and 
the thing qua ε-determined in a judgement, namely, as an appearance; 
ε-determinations are the product of a limitation of ο-determinacy, but 
they are precisely not aspects of numerically the same things that by defi-
nition have ο-determinacy, as metaphysical dual aspectists standardly 
believe (see further below, Sect. 9.8).
What is also at issue here is that the thing in itself should be seen 
as the ground of the appearance, rather than as an aggregate of phe-
nomenal objects as derivative beings that are somehow contained in 
an alleged actual ens originarium (cf. A579/B607). This is confirmed 
by Kant at the end of the section on the transcendental Ideal: Strictly 
speaking, the limitation by means of which “objects of the senses” are 
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determined in an empirical judgement is a limitation, not merely of “the 
sum total of all possibility” (A573/B601), but, more specifically, of “the 
material for the possibility of all objects of sense”, i.e. “the one all-encom-
passing experience”, “in which the real of all appearances is given” 
(A581ff./B609ff.; trans. emended and emphasis added). Limitation here 
thus indicates the schematised use of the category as applied to objects of 
possible experience. Objects of experience are limitations of the totality 
of all possible objects in nature.
9.8  Limitation and Idealism
Does the above analysis decide in favour of the two-aspects reading 
of idealism in its metaphysical version? I think not, for, as I said in 
the last section, the two-aspects reading illicitly assumes the numeri-
cal identity or sameness of the thing across the noumenal and phe-
nomenal realms (unless one adopted the composite view, as suggested 
earlier, but I think a composite view skirts round the real issue of the 
relation between the thing in itself or things in themselves and appear-
ances). Disregarding even the fact that the thing in itself concerns an 
ens rationis, not an empirically given thing, as we saw above, the deter-
minate set of predicates attributed to the thing judged about—even 
an indefinite amount of such ε-determinations—constitutes an object 
that is ex hypothesi numerically different from the complete set of 
all possible predicates that constitutes the thing as it is in itself, as a 
thoroughly determined individual. Two-aspect readings of the tran-
scendental distinction, either of the metaphysical or methodological 
kind, cannot account for this constitutive difference. Both interpreta-
tions fail to grasp the implications of Kant’s theory of discursive logic 
for the status of the object to which the judging intellect relates. They 
also fail to understand the very concept of determination (and thus 
the relation between ε-determination and ο-determination), as well 
as what it means for an individual to be an individual. One aspect of 
this misunderstanding is that one is wont to insist on an absolute dis-
tinction between the metaphysical and epistemological senses of the 
notion ‘determination’. As we have seen, such an absolute distinction 
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is valid only insofar as this distinction correlates with the distinction 
between appearance and thing in itself. But as soon as one talks about 
the thing in itself and its possible complete determinacy, then the 
distinction is wrong-headed, because it is precisely the metaphysical 
properties or determinations that are being talked about, not merely 
how we determine, by virtue of ε-determination, the thing in a judge-
ment.
Longuenesse (2005) appears to sidestep the idealism issue and thus 
the question about the identity between appearance and the thing in 
itself altogether by espousing a thoroughly empirical-realist view of the 
transcendental Ideal. Her view of the principle of complete or thor-
oughgoing determination (POD) can be labelled reductionist.70 For she 
reads POD in such a way that it merely concerns the comparabili ty of 
one object of experience with another, with every other possible, object 
of experience, that is, in terms of the totality of possible experience—
presumably relying on Kant’s suggestions in this direction at the end 
of the chapter on the transcendental Ideal (B609ff.).71 Longuenesse 
emphasises the one sphere of which there are subspheres as the whole of 
objects of possible, empirical, experience, not as the omnitudo realitatis 
in a transcendental sense.72 That is to say, in her view, the totum 
realitatis “is a sensible, conceptually indeterminate whole necessarily 
presupposed as the background of any empirical given” (Longuenesse 
1998:308; cf. 2005:223). However, this can only be partly correct, 
since the sum total of the thing’s predicates of which Kant speaks, is not 
coextensive with the putative totality of “the predicates of appearance” 
(A581/B609; emphasis added). Even if all of the spatiotemporal, 
sensibly experienceable, properties of all appearances were determined, 
it would still not be tantamount to the complete determination of the 
thing in itself (or all things in themselves), in terms of the totality of 
reality (All der Realität; A576/B604). All possible ε-determinations 
of appearances in empirical space, that is, nature itself, do not map 
onto the ο-determination of the thing in itself as the totality of reality. 
This is confirmed by Kant in the Prolegomena, when he asserts that 
the “sensible world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected 
according to universal laws”, which “has therefore no subsistence by 
itself ” and “is actually not the thing in itself and consequently must point 
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to that which contains the ground [den Grund ] of this appearance, to 
beings [Wesen] which cannot be cognized merely as appearances, but as 
things in themselves” (Prol, 4:354 [Kant 1977:95]; trans. emended and 
emphasis added; cf. 4:353).
Longuenesse (2005:218) appears to regard the object of empirical 
experience as the same individual thing that is completely determinable, 
and although Kant does speak of thoroughgoing determination of an 
object of sense (A581–2/B609–10), I believe the passage as a whole 
should be read in a non-reductionist fashion as saying that “the thing 
itself (in appearance), namely the real” is the transcendental object, 
which we subsequently determine, by means of what would be the 
schematised category of limitation applied to sensible spatiotemporal 
content in intuition, as the object of experience. Although reality for 
us, as discursive cognisers, is of course always “empirical reality” (A582/
B610), this does not mean, on Kant’s view, that by implication all 
reality is empirical.73
Remarkably, Longuenesse also claims that POD is not a new 
principle, but one that “Kant could have given as a corollary of the 
principle of all synthetic judgments” (2005:219), thus as a principle 
of the understanding. Longuenesse’s reading of POD illustrates what 
a thoroughgoing empirical realism, which shows no particular interest 
in the metaphysical issues surrounding Kant’s idealism, results in, viz. 
a reduction of the thing in itself to the whole of possible experience, 
to the sensible world. I think Longuenesse’s view contradicts Kant’s 
differentiation between what makes a thing a thing or a “Something” 
(A574/B602) and the way in which appearances are the determinate 
objects of experience. She conflates the material (ontological-
metaphysical) conditions of the synthetic content necessary for the 
conception of things as things and the transcendental (epistemological-
metaphysical) conditions for the necessary form of any object if it is to 
be an object of empirical experience.
As in TD it was made clear that the analytic principle of self-con-
sciousness rests on a synthesis of intuitive empirical content, which 
thus establishes the concept of an object in general and hence con-
stitutes the principle of experience, I have argued here that the 
principle of possible experience itself in turn necessarily rests on a 
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synthesis of the “the data, the material so to speak, or the transcendental 
content, for the possibility and the thoroughgoing determination of 
all things”, what Kant calls the “transcendental substratum” (A575/
B603). The latter synthesis is governed by POD, a genuinely new meta-
physical principle that is not just implied by the principles of possible 
experience, as Longuenesse would have us believe. This also explains 
the necessary presupposition of the thing in itself as the ground of an 
appearance (Bxxvii), with which it a fortiori cannot be identified, not 
even with the whole of all possible appearances. For the “transcendental 
substratum” is not the whole of possible experience, even though it is 
the whole of possible experience that is presupposed, as Kant says, as 
“the material for the possibility of all objects of the senses” (A582/B610; 
emphasis added).
9.9  Conclusion
Whereas Longuenesse’s apparent reduction of the thing in itself to 
the totality of experience wholly neglects Kant’s idealism, the current 
treatments of the topic of idealism, specifically in their two-aspect 
form, fail to recognise the limits imposed by our very discursivity 
in that these interpretations assume the object’s identity across the 
transcendental boundary. Contrary to this assumption, it should be 
observed that the object as appearance is not numerically the same 
as the thing in itself, not even if we abstracted from the appearance 
properties and consider the thing merely through concepts, as Wood 
would have it (as we saw in Sect. 9.4). Nor is it the case that purely 
through thinking the thing in itself we would thereby be able to pick 
out a noumenal object, as Adams suggests. As I have explained, this 
relates to Kant’s conception of a thing in itself as having to do with 
its complete determinacy (its ο-determination), which we can only 
grasp notionally, that is, as an Ideal of Reason—it is an ens rationis. 
Kant clearly states that “in order to cognize a thing completely one 
has to cognize everything possible and determine the thing through 
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it, whether affirmatively or negatively”, which for human beings is 
impossible. He continues:
Thoroughgoing determination is consequently a concept that we can 
never exhibit in concreto in its totality, and thus it is grounded on an idea 
which has its seat solely in reason, which prescribes to the understanding 
the rule of its complete use. (A573/B601)
What would be known ‘completely’, were we able to determine a 
thing qua its “Being” (Sachheit) (B602) as such—putatively by means 
of the categories of quality, in particular reality—would be the whole 
of its possible predicates. But a conceptual grasp of the complete thing 
in itself, other than purely notionally (as an ens rationis), is logically 
impossible, for it would mean, contradictorily, that our discursive 
synthesis in an actual judgement or indeed in an indefinite series of 
judgements (ε-determination) is tantamount to the complete synthesis 
of the thing’s possible predicates (ο-determination). We can have the 
concept or notion of a thing in itself, an individual—and indeed we 
must, as I argued in Sect. 9.6—but we cannot ε-determine a thing’s 
ο-determination. Also, what is completely determined, the thing in 
itself, is ipso facto no longer determinable. Therefore, that which is 
objectively ε-determined through limitation cannot, by implication, 
be numerically identical to that from which what is objectively 
ε-determined is delimited, that is, to the ‘illimitative’ real or the thing 
in itself. A delimitation of reality that results in a determined object 
by implication cannot be numerically identical to that from which the 
determined object is delimited, namely the all of reality.
This, it seems to me, refutes the idea that what in abstraction from 
sensibility we think, through the pure concepts, as general rules for 
the objective determination of representations that constitutes the 
object of knowledge, would be the thing in itself as such, namely the 
thoroughly or completely determined individual that is in fact the very 
metaphysical ground of the possibility of employing the pure concepts 
in predication. Therefore, the categories do not, in and of themselves, 
determine any individuated thing or object for the understanding 
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alone. In conclusion, Kant’s thesis about the subjective constraints 
of discursive thought itself already leads to idealism, namely, the 
restriction of the applicability of the categories to the transcendental 
object, which is the necessary correlate of our sensibility only, and is not 
serviceable even to conceive of things in themselves other than purely 
notionally. We thus do not have access, by means of the pure categories 
in abstraction from the constraints of sensibility, to intelligible objects, 
or to things in themselves qua things in themselves, contrary to what 
Adams, Wood, and others have suggested. This shows Kant’s radical 
subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge of objects, which affects 
not just our sensibility but also our conceptuality.
Notes
 1. See also B166n.
 2. Cf. Ameriks (2000b:163). Ameriks criticises Reinhold on this point, 
but see Schulting (2016) for a more positive (Kantian) outlook on 
Reinhold’s reading of the Unknowability Thesis.
 3. Cf. A241ff./B299ff.
 4. Precisely the identification of the concept of the thing in itself with the 
being of the thing in itself brought Hegel to think, against Kant, that 
there is no gap at all between thought and being, and that thus Kant’s 
restriction thesis is ungrounded. See again Chap. 8.
 5. It is interesting to note that Johann Friedrich Flatt, who was professor 
of philosophy and Hegel’s teacher in the Tübinger Stift, stated in his 
reply (Antikritik), published in the Philosophisches Magazin, to a review 
of his work Fragmentarische Beyträge zur Bestimmung und Deduction 
des Begriﬀes und Grundsatzes der Causalität und zur Grundlegung 
der natürlichen Theologie; in Beziehung auf die Kantische Philosophie 
(Frankfurt/Leipzig: Crusius, 1788), which Reinhold published in 
the Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung of 3 January 1789, that, contrary 
to Reinhold’s view of the unrepresentability of the thing in itself, 
the most that can be shown is that “keine dem ausser dem Gemüthe 
vorhandenen Gegenstande, nach seiner durchgängigen Bestimmung 
betrachtet, vollkommen entsprechende Vorstellung, für uns möglich 
sey” (Philosophisches Magazin II, 3, 1789, p. 387, published in reprint 
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in Aetas Kantiana; emphasis added). Flatt’s view may be seen as a 
precursor of the position that will be defended here. In Schulting 
(2016), I made an attempt to combine Reinhold’s views with the view 
that Flatt here advances. See further Henrich (2004:367ff.). I thank 
Manfred Baum for the reference to Flatt.
 6. See for Adickes’s views further below, Sect. 9.2.
 7. At least some of the categories, like substance and causality, would 
appear to have a transcendent function, most clearly in practical 
philosophy. Cf. Martin (1969:232ff.). See further Sect. 9.3.
 8. Like Van Cleve (1999:8), I believe that appearances, which he calls 
“virtual objects” or “intentional objects”, have no special kind of being 
of their own (existing apart from things in themselves). There is just 
one realm of being, of which appearances, as a distinct class of objects, 
are in some sense part. Van Cleve has a somewhat similar reading as 
mine; he writes: “My interpretation is nonetheless dualistic in the fol-
lowing sense: the distinction between appearances and things in them-
selves is a distinction between two separate universes of discourse—not 
between two ways of discoursing about the same class of objects. If 
there is a sense in which I believe in one world only, it is […] a world 
whose only denizens are things in themselves” (1999:150). On Van 
Cleve’s interpretation of idealism and my differences with it, see again 
Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 9. Cf. Van Cleve (1999:158).
 10. Collins (1999:15) is therefore wrong to suggest that empirical objects, 
appearances, can be called individuals. But Collins’s reading is 
consistent with his anti-representationalist reading of Kant’s idealism.
 11. For further discussion, see Schulting (2011:7–16, 2017a).
 12. Cf. B150; B298; B300; A242.
 13. Cf. Martin (1969:167).
 14. In Kant’s own copy of the Critique, “cognition” (Erkenntnis) is sub-
stituted for “concept” (Begriﬀ ) here, which makes more sense, as of 
course the pure categories do provide us a concept of the object, but not 
a cognition of the object, where cognition is understood as objectively 
real cognition.
 15. In the Italian Gentile translation gehen auf is aptly translated as riferirsi, 
meaning ‘refer to’.
 16. Cf. Prol §32, 4:314–315; A251ff.
 17. Cf. V-Met/Mron, 29:857.
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 18. On this aspect, see again Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 19. Cf. B182/A143: “[T]hat which corresponds [entspricht] to the 
sensation in these [appearances] is the transcendental matter of all 
objects, as things in themselves (thinghood, reality).”
 20. One could of course argue that the project in the Critique is precisely 
to demonstrate that there are things that exist extramentally, so that 
the thing’s existence cannot figure as the premise of the argument. 
This would mean not only that we cannot assume the existence of 
things, but also that, since it is based on something non-mental that 
prompts it, we cannot be sure of having sense perception either unless 
we assume some inner sensation-producing faculty of the mind or God 
having planted sense ideas in our minds (both of which Descartes sug-
gests are possibilities we cannot rule out). This in turn would invite the 
familiar transcendental argument strategy, espoused by so many readers 
of Kant. But I believe that Kant is not trying to demonstrate the exist-
ence of extramental things, i.e. that they exist, but rather, more mod-
estly and quite like Descartes for that matter, he wants to demonstrate 
the terms under which our representations acquire the objective reality 
or validity that connects them to extramental things (A197/B242).
 21. Cf. Ameriks (2000a:xxxv, n. 40). See also Westphal (2004:46) and 
Ameriks (2015).
 22. See B299. Unlike Frege, Kant does not appear to differentiate Sinn 
from Bedeutung (cf. Bird 2006:526ff.).
 23. Cf. Bird (2006:529). At A248/B305, Kant makes an ostensibly cru-
cial distinction regarding “pure categories, without formal conditions 
of sensibility, [that] have merely transcendental meaning [Bedeutung], 
but are not of any transcendental use [Gebrauch]” (trans. emended). 
Thanks to Tobias Rosefeldt for pointing this out. I take Kant’s remark 
to confirm my view that the categories do not pertain or refer to puta-
tive transcendent objects, and nonetheless continue to have some 
transcendental significance. It is not clear what the categories having 
meaning beyond the bounds of sense could yield in terms of them hav-
ing a putative object for themselves, in abstraction from the conditions 
of sensibility, for, as Kant says in the same passage, “(as merely pure 
categories) […] they do not have any use at all if they are separated 
from all sensibility, i.e., they cannot be applied to any supposed object at 
all ” (A248/B305; emphasis added). A bit earlier on, Kant writes more 
clearly: “The merely transcendental use of the categories is […] in fact 
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no use at all, and has no determinate or even, as far as its form is con-
cerned, determinable object” (see also B343/A287). For categories to 
have an object that is subsumed under them, “a function of the power 
of judgment [Urteilskraft]” is needed, i.e. a schema. “If this condition 
of the power of judgment (schema) is missing, then all subsumption 
disappears, for nothing would be given that could be subsumed under 
the concept” (B304). What is expressed is “only the thought of an 
object in general […] in accordance with different modi” (ibid.), i.e. 
the various pure concepts that together make up the intension of the 
concept of an object in general. The distinction between a logical object 
thought purely through the categories and an objectively real object 
would then amount to the distinction between the logical characteris-
tics contained in the concept of an object in general and any concrete 
schematisation of such a concept to a particular object, which can only 
be an object of sensible experience (cf. Grier 2001:81–83, 89). Kant 
is clear that “they [i.e. the categories] are merely the pure form of the 
employment of the understanding in regard to objects in general and of 
thinking [des Denkens], yet without any sort of object being able to be 
thought or determined through them alone [ohne doch durch sie allein 
irgend ein Objekt denken oder bestimmen zu können]” (A248/B305; 
emphasis added; cf. B147). Clearly, a logical “object in general” is not 
ipso facto a thing in itself.
 24. Cf. Westphal (2004:50–51) on the transcendental significance of the 
categories. See also Lau (2015:451).
 25. See also Ameriks (2000b:191–192n.4). Cf. Ameriks (2000b:254n.52, 
2003:149).
 26. Cf. Ameriks (2006:60), Rosefeldt (2006) and Heimsoeth (1984:247, 
259). See also FM, 20:270, where, interestingly, Kant connects the 
“logical I” with the “I that I think and intuit” and which is “a person”, 
in contrast to the “I that belongs to the object that is intuited by 
me”, which “is, similarly to other objects outside me, a thing” (Kant 
1983:73; emphasis added).
 27. Notice that at B157 Kant writes that “in the synthetic original unity 
of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, 
nor as I am in myself [wie ich an mir selbst bin], but only that I am”. 
This suggests that in apperception I am not conscious of myself as a 
thing in itself, nor as an object, but only of myself as being while doing 
the synthesising. However, the consciousness of this act of synthesis is a 
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transcendental self-consciousness, not a mere (empirical) consciousness, 
and so points to the noumenal self.
 28. Cf. Heimsoeth (1984:262).
 29. Ameriks (2000a:268) has suggested that the reason for thinking that 
there are real non-spatiotemporal essences might lie in Kant’s belief 
“that we are familiar with the essences of certain operations, and that 
in particular logic gives us the essence of our acts and thoughts. […] 
[T]he (theoretical) characteristics I have qua mind, which are just 
those I have through the acts of synthesis I carry out according to the 
categories, could in a sense be had without temporality because the 
categories have a meaning that is non-temporal”. I agree with the gen-
eral purport of Ameriks’s point here. However, the important question 
I believe is what the “essence of our acts and thoughts” is supposed 
to amount to other than a mere logical unity of thought, which, 
true, is necessarily carried out by a subject but, importantly, does not 
pick out an object (cf. B404/A346), i.e. an individual (a “personal 
being” sensu stricto; cf. Ameriks 2000a:277). The characteristics 
that are due to me being the subject and operator of my thoughts do 
not determine me substantially rather than merely qua the unity of 
the set of logical functions that are operated by me; there is indeed 
a subsisting transcendental, even personal subject of thought here, 
but this trans cendental subject cannot be equated with a numerically 
identical underlying substance. So (1) the self of pure thought is not 
simply to be taken as numerically identical to the noumenal self (as 
a thing in itself ) and (2) it is not the case that we literally think the 
latter’s nature merely by thinking, i.e. through mere thought, or, as 
Heimsoeth puts it referring to the Kant of the Lectures on metaphysics, 
through immediate intuition (see Heimsoeth 1956:233, 1984:242–
243). See further Heimsoeth (1956:236ff., 241, 245ff., 1984:247, 
253, 259–260). See also especially Ameriks (2006:60). See further 
Schulting (2017b).
 30. Cf. Heimsoeth (1956:241, 1984:253ff.).
 31. Cf. Refl 6001 (1780s), 18:420: “The soul is in the transcendental 
apperception substantia noumenon” (trans. mine). See also in particu-
lar B429: “[I]n the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the 
being itself, about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me 
for thinking.” Cf. Ameriks (2006:59).
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 32. Cf. B158, Prol, 4:334n., where Kant talks about apperception 
as “the feeling of an existence”. See Heimsoeth (1956:244–245, 
1984:258–259, 266); cf. Heimsoeth (1956:249–250) and Martin 
(1969:211).
 33. Cf. Heimsoeth (1956:74ff., 247). See further Schulting (2012:125–
135).
 34. What we know is the relation (Verhältnis) between two “dissimilar 
things” (unähnliche Dinge) (Prol, 4:358), which is an analogical 
relation.
 35. See also Guyer, who writes: “[Kant] never denies that the categories 
enter into our conception of things in themselves. Therefore, being an 
epistemic condition, as the categories clearly are, cannot itself be a suf-
ficient reason for exclusion from the concept of things in themselves” 
(Wood et al. 2007:15). Indeed, not from the concept of things in them-
selves, but to my mind it excludes the possible determination of the 
properties of a thing in itself qua itself, i.e. as a thing in itself proper, or 
the complete set of its properties (see further Sects. 9.6–9.8). Guyer, as 
so many others, conflates the concept of a thing in itself (de dicto) and 
the thing in itself (de re).
 36. The principle of the identity of indiscernibles =df ‘an object x 
is identical to an object y if x has exactly the same properties as 
y’ {∀x∀y(∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x = y)} (cf. Kant A272/B328; B337/ 
A281); this is often paired with the principle of indiscernibility 
of identicals =df ‘to a thing x are attributed exactly the same 
properties as are attributed to a thing y if x and y are identical’ 
{∀x∀y(x = y → (Fx ↔ Fy))}. In his critique of Leibniz, Kant famously 
argues that although the former principle might hold for things 
in themselves (that is, things in themselves are qualitatively and 
numerically identical or the same), this does not hold for appearances; 
two appearances might have the same qualities, but could very well 
differ qua numerical identity.
 37. Van Cleve carefully notes that it is not clear “whether it is Kant’s view 
that Leibniz’s principles do definitely hold for things in themselves (as 
he sometimes says), or only that they would hold for the noumena in 
the positive sense, it being problematic whether things in themselves are 
noumena in that sense. (They are not noumena in the positive sense 
for us, but may be so for other beings)” (1999:292n.41). Notice that 
Kant says of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles that it 
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“holds merely of concepts of things in general [Begriﬀen der Dinge über-
haupt]” (A272/B328; emphasis added). On the use of the principle of 
identity of indiscernibles, see also Quarfood (2008:615ff., 2011).
 38. Cf. Van Cleve (1999:150, 292n.44).
 39. “Is an appearance the very same entity as a thing in itself ? […] the 
identity interpretation says yes” (Wood 2005:66); “Once we have 
abstracted from the sensible—e.g., the spatiotemporal—properties of 
the object as appearance, hence from our empirical cognition of it, it 
must be the same as itself thought solely through pure concepts of the 
understanding and distinct from any thing which is represented as other 
than it (for instance, from a diﬀerent appearance regarded as it is in 
itself )” (Wood 2005:69).
 40. Notice that traditionally the principium individuationis and the 
principium identitatis were distinguished anyway. I thank Wolfgang Ertl 
for pointing this out.
 41. Cf. Martin (1969:174–175).
 42. Cf. Quarfood (2011).
 43. Cf. Maier (1930:45–46). Maier writes (quoting A282n.): “Realitates 
noumena, nur durch den reinen Verstand gedachte und erkennbare 
Realitäten (wie sie auf dem Standpunkt der Dissertation angenommen 
werden), die als gegenständliche Korrelate der reinen Kategorie 
gelten könnten, gibt es nicht, jedenfalls nicht in der Bedeutung 
von intelligiblen Bestimmungen. Wir können sie höchstens rein 
logisch als positive Prädikate überhaupt, als Bejahungen denken, ohne 
imstande zu sein, ‘ein Beispiel von dergleichen reiner und sinnenfreier 
Realität’ anzuführen” (boldface mine).
 44. On the different senses of Kant’s notion of ‘transcendental object’, see 
Willaschek (1998:333–335).
 45. Cf. e.g. Prol, 4:359, where interestingly Kant asserts, regarding one 
prominent thing in itself, that “the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable 
and even unthinkable in any determinate way [auf bestimmte Weise 
sogar undenkbar] as to what it is in itself ” (Kant 1977:99; emphasis 
added). We can of course conceive of the Supreme Being, in having an 
understanding of Him as necessarily having the properties of  ‘eternity’, 
‘omnipotence’, and ‘omnibenevolence’, but we cannot conceive of 
Him “in any determinate way”. That is, all our talk about the Supreme 
Being remains perfectly speculative, however logically or conceptually 
consistent.
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 46. For further discussion, see Schulting (2012, Chap. 5). For a much 
briefer account, see also Chap. 2 (this volume).
 47. It concerns Reflexion 4674 from the Duisburg Nachlass (Refl, 17:646). 
Kant writes further that “the mind [das Gemüth] is […] itself the arche-
type [Urbild ] [of the possibility] of […] synthesis” (Refl, 17:647 [Kant 
2005:160]). Guyer and Wood (Kant 1998:54) fundamentally underes-
timate Kant’s claim by maintaining that it is about merely an analogy 
between the way I conceive of myself and the way I must conceive of 
objects.
 48. See further Chaps.  4 and 7.
 49. The ontological status of the latter kind of thing concerns what Kant 
calls the Sachheit, das Reale of a thing (B182/A143; B207ff.). At B182, 
Kant explicitly associates “reality” with the “thinghood” of things in 
themselves as regards their “transcendental matter”.
 50. Cf. A104; A613–14/B641–2.
 51. Put in a nutshell, the knowledge that I can have of an object, of which I 
can acquire a priori insight that can thus be analytically demonstrated, 
concerns the knowledge of an object, insofar as, as Kant says in the 
B-preface (Bxviii), I have put certain, both intuitive and conceptual, 
forms into it.
 52. Surprisingly, Longuenesse (2005:213n.5) suggests that the Critical 
philosophy made this view about material synthesis as the ground of a 
priori synthesis irrelevant (!). According to Longuenesse (2005:213), it 
is not reality, as matter, that precedes form, but form (a priori forms of 
sensibility) that precedes matter.
 53. This is one of the reasons motivating Kant to distinguish between the 
form of the known object (appearance) and the thing itself.
 54. Longuenesse (2005:227–228) assumes that for the Critical Kant 
the form of possibility precedes matter. She seems to forget to distin-
guish, first, between the necessary form of possible objects of experi-
ence, where indeed possibility precedes actuality, and the a posteriori 
givenness of the material, sensible content that is a precondition of 
experience at all and so necessarily precedes the necessary form of pos-
sibility. Furthermore, let’s not fail to recall that in matters metaphysical 
Kant adheres to an essentially Aristotelian view of matter as preceding 
form; hence, Kant speaks of “material for [zu] all possibility” (A573/
B601; trans. emended). On the other hand, Longuenesse would appear 
to be right in holding that in the Transcendental Analytic, from the 
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transcendental perspective that looks at the conformity of concept and 
the form of an object, form precedes matter, for on the Copernican 
view everything has to be conceived from within the form that reason 
puts into things (cf. Bxvii).
 55. Though formally distinct from it, PET (p ⋁ ¬p) in its turn rests ulti-
mately on the principle of non-contradiction PNC [¬(p ⋀ p)]. PET 
grounds the logical necessity of a cognition, whereas PNC determines 
its logical possibility (cf. Log, 9:53).
 56. Regarding universality, see also the Jäsche Logic, §21, in Log, 9:102–
103.
 57. Cf. B596, where Kant speaks of an “idea in individuo”: it concerns the 
prototype of an individual. For further discussion, see Verburgt (2011).
 58. Cf. Heimsoeth (1969:429).
 59. See A571/B599. Cf. Refl 5270–5274, 18:138–140.
 60. Cf. Longuenesse (2005:216).
 61. Cf. Refl 5905, 18:380. See also WDO, 8:138n.
 62. Kant does not seem to consistently distinguish between ‘predicates’ 
(Prädikate) and ‘properties’ (Eigenschaften), using both to character-
ise things (for the application of the term ‘predicate’ to things see e.g. 
A571–2/B599–600; A573/B601; V-Met/Volckmann, 28:410, quoted 
at the outset of this chapter). But Kant’s transcendental idealism also 
makes it difficult to apply this distinction (predicates/properties) rig-
orously to how objects of experience are determined in judgements 
and how things can be said to have properties: do the predicates predi-
cated in a judgement about an object correspond to the properties of 
the object, that is, are the properties possessed just by the object of my 
judgement, or also by the thing in itself underlying it? My distinction 
between ε-determination and ο-determination reflects this difficulty in 
Kant.
 63. Of course, I could still be mistaken about empirical properties of 
the object that I judge about, but I cannot be mistaken about the 
instantiation of the categories in any object that I judge about, because 
the instantiation of the categories is constitutive of the objective 
validity of my judgement, and thus of the very objectivity of the object 
of my judgement (see again Chap. 4 for discussion). Hence, the true 
correspondence mentioned here concerns transcendental truth.
 64. In Refl 3063, 16:638, Kant likens infinite judgement to judgement 
of determination. Cf. A576ff./B604ff. and PND, 1:395. See further 
Longuenesse (1998:294ff.).
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 65. Reich (2001:185) associates transcendental affirmation explicitly with 
the category of reality. Transcendental affirmation could be labelled 
‘original’ affirmation. A determinate negation (‘is not’ in the judge-
ment S is not P) cannot be thought without already having presupposed 
(originally) its opposite, that is, by having aﬃrmed reality (the same 
holds of course for a determinate affirmation, ‘is’ in any judgement 
S is P).
 66. Cf. Refl 5270, 18:138.
 67. Cf. Longuenesse (1998:293). In regard to the notion of conceptus 
infimus, see Stuhlmann-Laeisz (1976:78ff.).
 68. For discussion, see again Chap. 3.
 69. See Kjosavik (2008:393), who points out, somewhat vaguely but 
in essence correctly, that the “imposition” of an objective structure, 
through synthesis, is not “directly upon a thing in itself ”, but rather 
“upon a matter that is given to us” (Kjosavik quotes ÜE, 8:215).
 70. Longuenesse differentiates between “legitimate (critical)” and “illegiti-
mate (intellectualist) uses of the principle of complete determination” 
(2005:213). She herself indeed talks about a “critical reduction”, i.e. 
the disentangling of the principle as well as the notion of the whole of 
reality “from the rationalist illusion” (2005:214). See also Longuenesse 
(1998:308ff.). For a critique of Longuenesse’s reading of POD, see also 
Verburgt (2011:250–252).
 71. Cf. Adickes’ critique of Cohen’s neo-Kantian notion of the “Inbegriff der 
wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse” (Adickes 1924:34n.). Longuenesse’s 
interpretation bears a close resemblance to Cohen’s. Longuenesse writes: 
“The infinite sphere whose division would yield all concepts of possible 
entities, in which infinite judgement thinks the object thought under its 
subject-concept is then the infinite sphere of the concept: ‘object given 
in space and time’, that is to say ‘object of experience’” (2005:218; cf. 
Longuenesse 1998:297).
 72. Cf. Longuenesse (1998:296). She speaks of the “infinite sphere of all 
possible determination” in terms of a “merely logical representation”, 
“logical space”. Although it is true, of course, that Kant criticised the 
hypostatisation of the totality of possible determinations, that is, the 
“all of reality”, into an ens realissimum that would contain all these 
determinations, he does not thereby mean such a totality to be “merely 
logical”. On the contrary, the logical space of all possible determina-
tions has an ontological thrust, which is why Kant asserts that the con-
cept of such a completely determined object is “transcendent” (A571/
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B599) and serves as transcendental Ideal. Longuenesse rejects the infer-
ence from the “logical (conceptual) primacy of reality to its ontological 
primacy” (1998:308), but she simply confuses ontology with empirical 
reality, or actuality, here.
 73. The passage that appears to lend support to Longuenesse’s reading 
should, I believe, be read as suggesting that we distinguish between 
“the thing itself (in appearance), namely the real” (emphasis added) and 
“the real of all appearances” (das Reale aller Erscheinungen) (A582/B609; 
emphasis added; the Guyer/Wood translation is not precise here, by 
rendering the last passage as “the real in all appearances”), whereby two 
kinds of reality are to be distinguished: empirical reality, i.e. “the real of 
all appearances”, and reality simpliciter, i.e. Being (A574/B602), which 
is the reality referred to “in appearance”.
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